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Introduction
In 1976, Americans celebrated the bicentennial of the Declaration of
Independence, which proclaims that all people are endowed with "certain
unalienable rights,"' including those of "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness. ",2 That same year also marked the recognition in both case law
and statutory law of a new right: the right to die.3 In the following two
1. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
2. Id.
3. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 662-64 (N.J.), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v.

BETTER OFF DEAD THAN DISABLED?

decades, almost every state has affirmed this right m its statutory law or
case law,4 and the United States Supreme Court has found that competent

persons have a "constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing
unwanted medical treatment." 5 More recently, a federal appellate court
held that recognition of the right to die necessarily includes a right to
physician-assisted suicide.6

These cases and statutes have arisen because advances m medical
technology have drastically changed the way physicians treat patients 7 and
how and where Americans die. In 1939, barely one-third (thirty-seven

percent) of Americans died m hospitals or nursing homes.' Less than five
decades later, however, between eighty percent and eighty-five percent of
Americans died in hospitals or nursing homes. 9 Furthermore, seventy
percent of these individuals did so after a decision to forgo life-sustaining

treatment.' 0
Many of these people died after enduring treatments that were unheard
of fifty years ago. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) was not effectively developed until 1960 when it was introduced as an emergency means
of restoring circulation m cardiac arrest victims." Soon, however, CPR
New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7194.5

(West Supp. 1996).
4. See infra notes 35-50 and accompanying text.
5. Cruzan v Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).
6. Compassion m Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 838 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
grantedsub nom. Washington v Glucksberg, 65 U.S.L.W 3218 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (No.
96-110). Another federal appellate court declined to hold that the right to die necessarily
includes the right to physician-assisted suicide, but still struck down New York statutes
barring it on equal protection grounds. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 724-25, 731 (2d Cir.),
cert. granted, 65 U.S.L.W 3218 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (No. 95-1858). These cases are
discussed more fully below. See infra notes 51-68 and accompanying text.
7 According to one historian, "[n]inety percent of the medicine being practiced today
did not exist m 1950." John Steele Gordon, How America's Health Care Fell il, AM.
HERITAGE, May/June 1992, at 49, 49, quoted in John Carroll Byrnes, The Health Care
Decisions Act of 1993, 23 U. BALT. L. REv 1, 6 n.18 (1993).
8. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 812 n.61 (citing Cathaleen A. Roach, Paradox
and Pandora'sBox: The Tragedy of CurrentRight-to-Die Jurisprudence,25 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 133, 156 (1991)).
9. Roach, supra note 8, at 156 (citing PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF
ETHICAL PROBLEMS INMEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAviORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING
TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 17-18 (1983)).

10. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 303 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Helene Levens Lipton,
Do-Not-Resuscitate Decisions in a Community Hospital: Incidence, Implications, and
Outcomes, 256 JAMA 1164, 1168 (1986)).
11. Kathleen M. Boozang, Death Wish: ResuscitatingSelf-Determinationfor the Criti-
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became standard procedure m hospitals, and many hospitals established a
requirement that it be performed m all cases except when a do-not-resuscitate
order had been executed. 12
Iron lungs for polio patients were introduced m the 1950s, and respirators, or positive pressure ventilators, came into use m the 1960s. 13 These
ventilators require either an endotracheal or tracheostomy tube. 14 Like CPR,
mtubation of patients in respiratory arrest became standard practice m hospitals unless the patient had previously executed a do-not-resuscitate order.

Widespread use of intravenous nutrition for patients that could neither

eat nor tolerate gastrostomy tubes also began m the 1960s. 15 Although not
an emergency procedure giving rise to presumed consent, health care
providers have often resisted removal of a feeding tube once it has been
inserted, and patients and families have responded by suing to have their
wishes honored. 16 These suits have sought equitable relief m the form of
orders requiring health care providers to discontinue treatment and let
patients die.
The widespread recognition of the right to die has also spawned another
type of lawsuit: suits for damages alleging that patients who received
cally. Ill, 35 ARIZ. L. REV 23, 24 n.2 (1993) (citing Council on Ethical and Jud. Aff.,

American Med. Ass'n, Guidelinesfor the Appropriate Use of Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders, 265
JAMA 1868, 1868 (1991)). CPR "is the term used to refer to a constellation of procedures
administered to patients 'to restore cardiac function or to support ventilation in the event of
a cardiac or respiratory arrest' and hence to oxygenate the blood supply, especially vital for
brain functioning." 1 ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE § 9.4, at 543 (2d ed. 1995) (citation
omitted). Additionally:
highly intrusive, and some are violent in nature.
Many of these procedures are
The defibrillator, for example, causes violent (and painful) muscle contractions
from osteoporosis, may cause fracture of vertebrae
which, in a patient suffering
or other bones. Such fractures, in turn, cause pain, which may be extreme.
In re Dinnerstem, 380 N.E.2d 134, 135-36 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978) (citing 3 MARSHALL HOUTs
& IRWIN

H.

HAUT, COURTROOM MEDICINE SERIES: DEATH

§ 1.01(3)(d) (1976)).

12. See Boozang, supra note 11, at 24-25; Alvin H. Moss, Informing the PatientAbout
CardiopulmonaryResuscitation: When the Risks Outweigh the Benefits, J. GEN. INTERNAL
MED., July-Aug. 1989, at 349, 353; see also MEISEL, supra note 11, at 544-45.

13.

Gordon L. Snider, Thirty Years of Mechancal Ventilation: Changing Implications,

143 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 745, 745-46 (1983), cited in Byrnes, supra note 7, at 6 n.18.
14. Id. at 746.
15.

MAURICE E. SHILS & VERNON R. YOUNG, MODERN NUTRITION IN HEALTH AND

DISEASE 1024-25 (7th ed. 1988), cited in Byrnes, supra note 7, at 6 n.18.
16. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 265 (1990);
Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 298 (Ct. App. 1986); Elbaum v. Grace Plaza
of Great Neck, Inc., 544 N.Y.S.2d 840, 843 (App. Div. 1989). For a comprehensive list of
cases concerning the removal of artificial nutrition and hydration, see MEISEL, supra note 11,
at 607-08.

BETTER OFFDEAD THAN DISABLED?
unwanted life-sustaining treatment suffered a compensable injury when their
right to die was violated. The majority of the suits seeking damages for the
unauthorized provision of life-sustaining treatment have relied on traditional
common-law torts, such as battery and infliction of emotional distress, or on
a constitutional tort under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.17 There has also been a call,
however, for the recognition of a new tort: wrongful living. 18 Plaintiffs
bringing wrongful living actions essentially claim that their dimunshed
quality of life after or while receiving treatment makes their life not worth
living, and thus, that they would be better off dead.9 To date, few courts
have ruled on the viability of such a cause of action.
Given the increasing use of living wills, durable powers of attorney, and
other instruments memorializing patients' wishes to refuse treatment, however, the number of wrongful living cases is likely to increase dramatically
These cases will force courts to attempt to answer the question of whether a
plaintiffs life is worth living. Their response may potentially have a profound mipact on persons with disabilities that have istorically been viewed
as indeed having lives not worth living.
This Article argues that courts should reject a wrongful living tort
because "life is not a compensable harm."10 In making tlus argument, tis
Article first examines the rise of case law and statutory law covering an
individual's right to die. 2 Part II then discusses the medical profession's
consistent failure to honor patients' wishes to refuse life-sustaining treatment
despite the existing law concerning the right to die.'
Part III of the Article reviews extant case law on wrongful living and
the more abundant case law on "wrongful life" actions brought m the name
17 See M. Rose Gasner, FinancialPenaltiesfor Failing to Honor Patient Wishes to
Refuse Treatment, 11 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REv 499, 504-12 (1992) (discussing theories

advanced in cases seeking damages for failure to honor patients' refusal of treatment); Steven
I. Addlestone, Note, Liabilityfor Improper Maintenance of Life Support: Balancing Patient
and Physician Autonomy, 46 VAND. L. REV 1255, 1267-73 (1993) (same).

18. See generally William C. Knapp & Fred Hamilton, "Wrongftl Living" Resuscitation
as Tortious Interference with a Patient'sRight to Give Informed Refusal, 19 N. KY. L. REv
253 (1992); A. Samuel Oddi, The Tort of Interference with the Right to Die: The Wrongful

Living Cause of Action, 75 GEO. L.J. 625 (1986); Tricia Jones Hackelman, Comment,
Violation of an Individual'sRight to Die: The Need for a Wrongful Living Cause of Action, 64

U. CIN. L. REv 1355 (1996).
19. See, e.g., McGuinness v. Barnes, No. A-3457-94T5, slip op. at 8-9 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. Aug. 6, 1996); Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., 614 N.E.2d 841,
846 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992), appeal after remand, 1995 WI 109128 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 15,
1995), rev'd, 671 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1996).
20. Anderson, 614 N.E.2d at 846.
21. See infra notes 35-68 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 69-107 and accompanying text.
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of children with disabilities alleging that it would be better if they had not
been born. 3 Courts have been reluctant to recognize either action because
of a conceptual unwillingness to say that "life, even with severe disabilities,
constitutes an actionable injury"' and because of the impossibility of
calculating damages based on a comparison between life with a disability
and no life at all.
Not all courts have agreed, however, that life with a disability is better
than no life at all. Part IV of the Article discusses how the debate on the
right to die, assisted suicide, and wrongful life reflects societal prejudice
towards persons with disabilities.'
The Article examnnes the historical
view that life with a disability is not worth living as reflected in both popular culture and right-to-die case law I Tius view still predominates, but
courts have recently recognized the impact of this prejudice and the lack of
support services for persons with disabilities in deciding right-to-die and
2
assisted suicide cases. 8
Part V argues that courts should be "attuned to the worth of an
individual Irrespective of physical or mental handicap,"29 and that therefore
they should reject a wrongful living cause of action.30 Courts should reject
wrongful life clais because: (1) "legal recognition that a disabled life is
an injury would harm the interests of those most directly concerned, the
handicapped; "31 (2) the question of whether one would be better off dead
is one that courts are not equipped to handle and is antithetical to "the very
nearly uniform high value which the law and mankind has placed on human
life, rather than its absence; "32 (3) it is impossible to calculate compensatory
damages based on the comparison between life with a disability and death;
and (4) there are adequate remedies available under traditional tort
principles for patients whose refusal of treatment has not been honored.

23. See infra notes 108-240 and accompanying text.
24. See Flanagan v Williams, 623 N.E.2d 185, 191 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
25. See infra notes 241-324 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 242-47 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 248-324 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 315-24 and accompanying text.
29. McKay v Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 628 (Nev 1990).
30. See infra notes 325-56 and accompanying text.
31. Smith v Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 353 (N.H. 1986) (quoting Geoffrey Disston Menott
& Vincent Phillip Zunzolo, Comment, Wrongful Life: A Misconceived Tort, 15 U.C. DAVIS
L. Rnv 447, 459 (1981)).
32. Greco v United States, 893 P.2d 345, 348 (Nev 1995) (quoting Becker v
Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. 1978)).
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L Recognition of the Right to Die:
From Quinlan to Cruzan to Assisted Suicide
Advances m medical technology have made it possible for people to
live longer than ever before.33 It is now possible for patients to continue
living for years even when much of their physical and mental capacity has
been irrevocably lost. Some have questioned the "quality" of those lives,
however, and begimng m the 1970s, patients and their families began
"asserting a right to die a natural death without undue dependence on medical technology or unnecessarily protracted agony - in short, a right to 'die
with dignity "31 Courts have recognized this right based on two grounds:
(1) the constitutional right to be free from an invasion of one's bodily
integrity, including unwanted medical treatment, and (2) a common-law
right to refuse medical treatment.
A. The Recognition of the Right to Die
The first courts to recognize a right to die based their rulings on the
constitutional right to privacy In In re Quinlan,35 the New Jersey Supreme
Court concluded:
Although the Constitution does not explicitly mention a right of privacy,
Supreme Court decisions have recognized that a right of personal privacy
exists and that certain areas of privacy are guaranteed under the Constitution.
Presumably this right is broad enough to encompass a patient's
36
decision to decline medical treatment under certain circumstances
A number of courts followed Quinlan and found that the right to die was
within the right to privacy under the United States Constitution or the
individual state's constitution.37 After Quinlan, however, most courts have
33. The median life expectancy is now 79 for women and 72 for men. UNITED
STATES BUREAU OF THE CENsus, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATEs:

1995, at

86 (115th ed. 1995).
34. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1220 (N.J. 1985).
35. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
36. In re Qumlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J.), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v New
Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
37 See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 681-82 (Ariz. 1987) (en banc);
Bouvia v Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 301 (Ct. App. 1986); Bartling v Superior
Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225 (Ct. App. 1984); In re Sevems, 425 A.2d 156, 158-59 (Del.
Ch. 1980); In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1244-45 (D.C. 1990) (en bane); In re Guardianship
of Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 267 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989), 4f'd, 568 So. 2d 4, 9-12
(Fla. 1990); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v Saikewzcz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424
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found a right to die based either solely on informed consent principles or
on both the right to informed consent and a constitutional privacy right.3"
In Cruzan, the Supreme Court noted that it had previously decided that
"[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the

common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and
control of Ins own person, free from all restraint or interference of others,
unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law "" The Court stated

that one of the primary means of protecting this notion of bodily integrity
is the informed consent doctrine.' Justice (then Judge) Cardozo's famous
expression of this doctrine states: "Every human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body;
and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent
commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages." 4' The Cruzan
Court decided that a "logical corollary of the doctrine of informed consent

is that the patient generally possesses the right not to consent, that is, to
refuse treatment. "42

The Supreme Court in Cruzan, however, did not rely solely on the
common law in recognizing a right to die. The Court noted that "[t]he
(Mass. 1977); Leach v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr., 426 N.E.2d 809, 814 (Ohio Ct. C.P 1980);
In re Welfare of Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 742 (Wash. 1983) (en banc); see also ALAN D.
LiEBERSON, ADVANCE MEDICAL Dinz

s §§ 2.4-5 (1992 & Supp. 1996); MEISEL, supra

note 11, § 2.8, at 61-66; John D. Hodson, Annotation, JudicialPower to OrderDiscontinuance of Life-Sustamning Treatment, 48 A.L.R. 4TH 67, § 6[a], at 81-83 (1986 & Supp.
1996).
38. See Cruzan v Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 271 (1990) (citing
LAURENCE H. TRIE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-11, at 1365 (2d ed. 1988)).

39. Id. (quoting Union Pac. Ry v Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (refusing to
compel personal injury plaintiff to undergo pretrial medical examination)).
40. Id.
41. Schloendorffv Society of N.Y Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y 1914), quoted in
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269.
42. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270. Several courts have found no need to opine beyond
such a common-law analysis in recognizing the right to die. See, e.g., Barber v Superior
Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 489 (Ct. App. 1983); In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d
292, 297 (IIl. 1989); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 951 (Me. 1987); In re Peter, 529 A.2d
419, 422-23 (N.J. 1987); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 70 (N.Y 1981). See generally
LIEBERSON, supra note 37, § 2.3; MEISEL, supra note 11, § 2.7 Meisel includes a complete listing of right-to-die cases without regard to the rationale used in Section 1.7 of his
treatise. Id. at 19-31. For a discussion of the evolution of the common law in the United
States, England, and other countries regarding the consent to and refusal of medical
treatment, see Danuta Mendelson, HitstoncalEvolution and Modern Implications of Concepts
of Consent to, and Refusal of,Medical Treatment m the Law of Trespass, 17 J. LEGAL MED.
1 (1996).
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principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty
interest m refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our
prior decisions." 4I All nine Justices agreed on the existence of this liberty
interest, disagreeing only on how it should be balanced with the State's
expressed interests. 44
43. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278. Among the prior decisions discussed in the majority
opinion were several holding that patients have an interest in refusing to submit to specific
medical procedures. See Washington v Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990) (holding that
Washington's procedures for administrating antipsychotic medication to prisoners were
sufficient to satisfy due process concerns, but stating that "[tihe forcible injection of
medication into a non-consenting person's body represents a substantial interference with
that person's liberty"); Jacobson v Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27-33 (1905) (balancing
individual's interest m declining unwanted smallpox vaccine against state's interest m preventing disease).
44. The state's asserted interests in Cruzan were "the protection and preservation of
human life," Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280, and the safeguarding of personal choice on the
decision to refuse life support. Id. at 280-81. The interests most commonly asserted by
states in right-to-die cases are: (1) preservation of life, (2) prevention of suicide, (3) protection of the interests of innocent third parties, and (4) maintenance of the ethical integrity
of the medical profession. See MEISEL, supra note 11, §§ 8.15-.18, at 510-29; Hodson,
supra note 37, § 7, at 85-91.
The question before the Court in Cruzan was whether the Constitution forbids the state
from advancing these interests through the establishment of a "clear and convincing"
standard of proof when an incompetent patient's surrogate seeks the removal of life-sustainmg treatment. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280. The Court held that the Constitution does not and
that the state can establish such a standard. Id. at 281-84.
The evidence to which the "clear and convincing" standard is to be applied has been
the source of some confusion after Cruzan. One court has held that life-sustaining treatment
can be withdrawn from an incompetent patient only if there is "[n]othmg less than unequivocal proof" of the patient's prior express wishes regarding the decision to terminate life
support. In re Westchester County Med. Ctr., 531 N.E.2d 607, 612 (N.Y 1988). This is
defined as "proof sufficient to persuade the trier of fact that the patient held a firm and
settled commitment to the termination of life supports under the circumstances like those
presented." Id. at 613; see also Cruzan v Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 424 (Mo. 1988)
(en banc), aff'd, Cruzan v Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). When
defined this way, only a "minority of states requires that there be 'clear and convincing'
evidence of the patient's intent to withdraw life support." In re Fiori, 673 A.2d 905, 911
(Pa. 1996).
The term "clear and convincing evidence" is more commonly used to describe a
burden of proof that focuses on the person's life as a whole and not just their prior statements - or lack thereof - on life-sustaming treatment. This standard requires "the
proponent of withholding or withdrawing life support to bear the burden of proving by clear
and convincing evidence that the ward's decision would have been to forego life support."
Mack v Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 754 (Md. 1993) (emphasis added). When viewed in thils
way, "the overwhelming majority of cases" utilize the clear and convincing standard. Id.
For purposes of this Article, it will be assumed that a patient who receives life-sustaining
treatment against his wishes has made them known in a way that satisfies the clear and
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In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor stated:
I agree that a protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical
treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions and that the refusal
of artificially delivered food and water is encompassed within that liberty
interest.
Requiring a competent adult to endure [procedures for artificial hydration and nutrition] against her will burdens the patient's liberty,
dignity, and freedom to determine the course of her own treatment.
Accordingly, the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause must
protect, if it protects anything, an individual's deeply personal decision
to reject
medical treatment, including the artificial delivery of food and
45
water.
The right to die has also become firmly entrenched m state statutory
law California became the first state with a "living will" statute when it
enacted the Natural Death Act in 1976.1 In the findings and declarations
portion of the statute, the California legislature stated:
(a) an adult person has the fundamental right to control the decisions
relating to the relevancy of his or her own medical care, including the
decision to have life-sustaining treatment withheld or withdrawn in
instances of a terminal condition or permanent unconscious condition.
(b) modem medical technology has made possible the artificial prolongation of human life beyond natural limits.
(c) in the interest of protecting individual autonomy, such prolongation
of the process of dying for a person with a terminal condition
may
violate patient dignity and cause unnecessary pain and suffering, while
providing nothing medically necessary or beneficial to the person.
(d) In recognition of the dignity and privacy that a person has a right to
expect, the Legislature hereby declares that the laws of the State of Californa shall recogmze the right of an adult person to make a written
convincing evidence requirement, no matter how articulated.

45. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287, 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
Justice Brennan, in a dissent joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, rejected the clear
and convincing evidence standard as unduly burdensome on patients and their families. Id.
at 302 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He stated that Cruzan had "a fundamental right to be free
of unwanted artificial nutrition and hydration
" Id. Justice Stevens made a similar
statement m his dissent. Id. at 343 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia joined the
majority, but stated that while he agreed with its analysis he "would have preferred that we
announce, clearly and promptly, that the federal courts have no business in this field." Id.
at 293 (Scalia, J., concurring). Scalia also asserted that a person has no liberty interest in
rejecting artificial nutrition and hydration because doing so is tantamount to committing
suicide. Id. at 293-95.
46. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7194.5 (West Supp. 1996).
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declaration instructing his or her physician to withhold or withdraw lifesustaining treatment in the event of a terminal condition or permanent
unconscious condition, in the event that the person is unable to make
those decisions for himself or herself.47
Almost every state has now adopted a living will statute that permits
competent adults to execute advance directives stating that they do not wish
to be kept alive by medical treatment in the latter stages of a terminal
illness or if they become permanently and irreversibly unconscious.' In
addition, many states allow patients to delegate decisionmaking power to a

surrogate through a durable power of attorney, health care proxy, or sinilar
device, or permit courts to appoint surrogate decisionmakers.4 9

Federal

47 Id. § 7185.5.
48. The following list is updated from the one m 2 MEISEL, supra note 11, § 11.22:
ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1990 & Supp. 1996); ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010-.100
(Michie 1994); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-17-201 to -218 (Michle 1991 & Supp. 1995); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7194.5 (West Supp. 1996); COLO. REv STAT.
§§ 15-18-101 to -113 (Supp. 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-570 to -580c (West
Supp. 1996); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2508 (1995); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421
to -2430 (1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.101- 401 (West Supp. 1996); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 31-32-1 to -12 (1996); HAw. REv STAT. ANN. §§ 327D-1 to -27 (Michie Supp. 1992);
755 ILL. COMP STAT. ANN. §§ 35/1-10 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996); IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 16-36-4-1 to -21 (Michle 1993 & Supp. 1996); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A.1-.12 (West
1989 & Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28, 101-109 (1992 & Supp. 1995); KY. REV
STAT. ANN. §§ 311.621-.643 (Michie 1995); LA. REV STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1-.10
(West 1992 & Supp. 1996); ME. REv STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 5-801 to -817 (West Supp.
1995); MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN. I. §§ 5-601 to -618 (1994 & Supp. 1996); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 145B.01-.17 (West Supp. 1996); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to -121
(1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010-.055 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 50-9-101 to -206 (1995); NEB. REV STAT. §§ 20-401 to -416 (Supp. 1994); NEV REV
STAT. §§ 449.535-.690 (1995); N.H. REV STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:1 to 16 (1996); N.J.
STAT. §§ 26:211-53 to -78 (West 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -11 (Michie 1994
& Supp. 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-06.4-01 to -14 (1991 & Supp. 1995); OHIO REv
CODE ANN. §§ 2133.01-.15 (Banks-Baldwin 1994 & Supp. 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
63, §§ 3101.1-.16 (West Supp. 1996); OR. REV STAT. §§ 127.505-.660 (1993); 20 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5401-5416 (West Supp. 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-4.11-1 to -14
(Supp. 1995); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-10 to -160 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-101 to -112 (Supp. 1996); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§§ 672.001-.021 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to -1119
(1993 & Supp. 1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251-5262 (1987); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 54.1-2981 to -2993 (Michie 1994); WASH. REV CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010-.920 (West
1992 & Supp. 1996); W VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -13 (1995); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01.15 (West 1989 & Supp. 1995); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-22-101 to -208 (Michie 1994).
49. A complete list of state proxy provisions can be found m 2 MEISEL, supra note 11,
§ 12.52. See generally Colleen M. O'Connor, Statutory Surrogate Consent Provisions:An
Overview and Analysis, 20 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP 128 (1996).
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statutory law also favors permitting adult patients to refuse life-sustaining
treatment by advance directive, which requires hospitals receiving federal
financial support to notify adult patients of their right to execute such

instruments upon admission. 50

B. Beyond the Right to Die? Assisted Suicide
Two federal appellate courts have recently pointed to Cruzan and the
federal and state statutory law and held that recognition of the right to die by
courts and legislatures precludes the banning of physician-assisted suicide.51
The two courts disagreed, however, on whether the right to die necessarily
includes a right to physician-assisted suicide.
In Compassion in Dying v Washington, 2 the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found a right to physician-assisted suicide m
the liberty interest of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.53 The
court reviewed the various opinions in Cruzan and concluded:
50. The Patient Self-Determination Act requires health care providers participating in
Medicaid or Medicare programs to inform competent adult patients, no matter what their
reason for admission, about state laws on advance directives and to record any advance
directives the patient rmght have. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-508, §§ 4206, 4751, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-115, 1388-204 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1395cc(f) (Medicare), 1396a(w) (Medicaid) (1994)).
51. Quill v Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 727-31 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 65 U.S.L.W 3218
(U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (No. 95-1858); Compassion m Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 81516 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. grantedsub nom. Washington v Glucksberg, 65 U.S.L.W
3218 (U.S. Oct. 1,1996) (No. 96-110).
52. 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996).
53. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 838. The Compassion in Dying court noted that,
in upholding the right to abortion in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey, the Supreme Court had
surveyed its prior decisions and found a liberty interest sufficient to warrant constitutional
protection for "personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing, and education." Planned Parenthood v Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
851 (1992), quoted in Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 813. The Casey Court stated that:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make
in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right
to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 851, quoted in Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 813 (citations omitted).
The Compassion in Dying court found:Like the decision of whether or not to have an abortion, the decision how and when
to die is one of "the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime," a choice "central to personal dignity and autonomy " A competent terminally
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Cruzan stands for the proposition that there is a due process liberty interest
in rejecting unwanted medical treatment, including the provision of food and

water by artificial means. Moreover, the Court majority clearly recognized
that granting the request to remove the tubes through which Cruzan received
artificial nutrition and hydration would lead inexorably to her death.
Accordingly, we conclude that Cruzan by recognizing a liberty interest that
includes the refusal of artificial provision of life-sustaming food and water,
necessarily recognizes a liberty interest in hastening one's own death.'
While acknowledging "that in some respects a recognition of the legitimacy of physician-assisted suicide would constitute an additional step beyond
what the courts have previously approved,"I5 the court stated that "we see no
ethical or constitutionally cognizable difference between a doctor's pulling
the plug on a respirator and Ins prescribing drugs which will permit a
terminally ill patient to end his own life. "56 Accordingly, the appellate court
struck down Washington's statute banning assisted suicide as unconstitutional
as applied to competent, terminally ill patients who wish to hasten their
deaths with physician-prescribed medication.'
Less than a month later, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Quill v Vacco,5 s struck down New York's ban on assisted
suicide.5 9 The Quill court, however, rejected the claim that there was a
constitutional right to assisted suicide.' Instead, it found that the New York
laws prohibiting assisted suicide violated the Equal Protection Clause.6'
The Quill court noted that the Supreme Court has actually or impliedly
recognized only a few fundamental liberty interests and has been reluctant to
expand this list.62 The Quill court concluded:
ill adult, having lived nearly the full measure of his life, has a strong liberty interest
in choosing a dignified and humane death rather than being reduced at the end of his
existence to a childlike state of helplessness, diapered, sedated, incontinent.
Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 813-14 (citations omitted).
54. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 815-16 (citations omitted).
55. Id. at 823-24.
56. Id. at 824.
57 Id. at 838.
58. 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996).
59. Quill v Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 731 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 65 U.S.L.W 3218
(U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (No. 95-1858).
60. Id. at 724-25.
61. Id. at 727
62. Id. at 724 (citing 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NowAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTTIrONAL LAW § 15.7, at 434-37 (2d ed. 1992 & Supp. 1996)). Instead of relying
on Cruzan and Casey, the Qui!! court relied on Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) in wluch the Supreme Court held that there is no fundamental right to engage in consensual
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The right to assisted suicide finds no cognizable basis m the Constitution's language or design, even in the very limited cases of those competent persons who, m the final stages of terminal illness, seek the right to
hasten death. We therefore decline the plaintiffs' invitation to identify a
new fundamental right, in the absence of a clear direction from the Court
whose precedents we are bound to follow I

The Second Circuit, nonetheless, found that New York's laws against
assisted suicide were unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.' The
court noted that New York case law and statutory law recogmzed the right
of competent, terminally ill patients to hasten death through withdrawal of
life-sustaming treatment upon the proper proof of the desire to do so.'
Given this, the court stated that:
[I]t seems clear that New York does not treat similarly circumstanced
persons alike: those in the final stages of terminal illness who are on lifesupport systems are allowed to hasten their deaths by directing the
removal of such systems; but those who are similarly situated, except for
the previous attachment of life-sustaing equipment, are not allowed to
hasten death by self-administering prescribed drugs.'
homosexual sodomy - to support its conclusion that there is no fundamental right to
physician-assisted suicide. The Quill court stated:
As in Bowers, the statutes plaintiffs seek to declare unconstitutional here cannot
be said to infringe upon any fundamental right or liberty As in Bowers, the
right contended for here cannot be considered so implicit in our understanding
of ordered liberty that neither justice nor liberty would exist if it were sacrificed.
Nor can it be said that the right to assisted suicide claimed by plaintiffs is deeply
rooted in the nation's traditions and history.
Quill, 80 F.3d at 724.
63. Id. at 724-25.
64. Id. at 727
65. Id. at 727-28 (citing N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2960-2994 (McKinney 1993 &
Supp. 1996); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 341 (N.Y 1986); In re Eichner, 420 N.E.2d
64, 70-71 (N.Y 1981)).
66. Id. at 729. Other courts that have ruled on physician-assisted suicide are split on
whether it can be banned. The Supreme Court of Michigan rejected a due process challenge
to that state's assisted suicide statute. People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 724 (Mich.
1994). The court there stated:
We do not discern in Cruzan and its historic roots an indication that the federal
constitution protects a right more expansive than the right to refuse to begin or
to continue life-sustaining medical treatment. Neither do we find in Casey or m
the precedent from which it evolved an intent to expand the liberty interests
identified by the Court in such a manner.
Id. at 725; see also Donaldson v Van de Kamp, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59, 64 (Ct. App. 1992)
(finding that patient suffering from growing brain tumor did not have constitutional right to
assisted death that would result from premortem cryogenic treatment undertaken to preserve
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The constitutionality of states' prohibition of assisted suicide will
ultimately be decided by the Supreme Court, which heard arguments in
Quill and Compassion in Dying on January 8, 1997 67 No matter what the
Court decides, however, the mere fact that the effort to extend the right to
die has reached the Court only two decades after its initial recognition
reflects the widespread public acceptance of the right." Whether based on
the right of privacy, the common-law right of informed consent, or on state
statutory law, there can be no question that patients today have the ability

to refuse life-sustaining treatment. As the next Part discusses, however,
health care professionals often misunderstand or resist such refusals.
If. Patient Wishes and Health Care ProviderActions:

Patients'Refusal of Life-Sustaining Treatment Is Often
Misunderstoodor Ignored
The increase of assisted suicide cases and the sheer number of right-to-

die cases69 and statutes is not surprismg given the fact that both public
body until such future time as treatment for condition might be available).
In an interesting twist on the equal protection argument, the court m Lee v. Oregon
held that the Oregon Death with Dignity Act - a ballot initiative permitting doctors to
prescribe medications to allow terminally ill patients to end their lives - violated the Equal
Protection Clause because it treated the terminally ill differently than the nonterminally ill.
Lee v Oregon, 891 F Supp. 1429, 1438 (D. Or. 1995). The court there found that the
Death with Dignity Act deprived terminally ill persons of a benefit afforded the nonterminally ill: the Oregon statutory prohibition making it a crime for anyone, including
doctors, to assist a person in ending their lives. Id. at 1433-34 n.4 and accompanying text.
The court found that no rational basis existed for a state's allowing the terminally ill to
receive medical assistance that would enable them to hasten their deaths while preventing
the young and healthy from receiving similar medical assistance. Id. at 1438.
The Compassion in Dying court stated that the Lee decision was a clear error and was
directly contrary to its holding. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 838
(9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. grantedsub nom. Washington v Glucksberg, 65 U.S.L.W 3218
(U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (No. 96-110). These statements were criticized in a dissent from the
Ninth Circuit's decision not to have the court rehear the case en banc. Compassion in
Dying v Washington, 85 F.3d 1440, 1442 (9th Cir. 1996) (O'Scannlam, J., dissenting)
(denying en banc rehearing by Ninth Circuit). Judge O'Scannlam quoted from an unpublished order by the Oregon district court in which "the state defendants agree[d] with
plaintiffs that the Ninth Circuit's comments about Lee in the Compassion in Dying decision
were dicta 'and could be considered gratuitous and inappropriate.'' Id.
67 See Lyle Deniston, Justices Reluctant to Create a "Right" to Assisted Suicide;
Complexity of Issue Seen Best Addressed by State Legislatures, BALT. SUN, Jan. 9, 1997,
at IA.
68. The public acceptance of the right to die is discussed more fully below. See infra
at notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
69. There were at least 84 appellate decisions addressing the right to die issued prior
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opinion polls and scientific studies show that many people prefer not to be
placed on life-support systems.' This desire is often misunderstood by
health care providers, however, and even if it is understood - and is also
memorialized m an advance directive - this desire is often ignored.
A. Patients Preferto Avoid Life-Sustaining Treatment
A 1993 law review article surveying national opimon polls on end-oflife decisions found that a majority of people did not want to be kept alive
if they were on life-support systems or in a coma. 71 The percentage of
those saying that they would refuse treatment varied greatly, however,
depending on the description of the medical condition described in the poll
questions. When the condition was described as one that entailed "no hope
of recovering," "a coma with no brain activity," "terminally ill or in irreversible coma," or "a coma with no hope of recovery," between seventythree percent and eighty-five percent of respondents indicated that they
would want treatment stopped or withheld.'
A significantly smaller
number, fifty-one percent, indicated that they would want treatment stopped
if it made them "totally dependent on a family member or other person for
all of [their] care. "I Only forty-four percent of the respondents desired
continued treatment if they "had a disease with no hope of improvement
that made it hard for you to function in your day-to-day activities."I
to the Supreme Court's decision in Cruzan. George J.Annas, The "Right to Die" in
Amenrica: Sloganeenngfrom Quinlan and Cruzan to Quill and Kevorkian, 34 DUQ. L. REV
875, 882 (1996); see also Cruzan v Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 412 n.4 (Mo. 1988) (en
bane) (collecting 54 reported decisions from 1976-88), aft'd, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
70. James Lindgren, Death by Default, L. & CONTEMP PROBS., Summer 1993, at
185, 197-99. Lindgren reviews over 200 questions from public opinion polls conducted
between 1973 and 1991.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.at 198.
74. Id.at 198-99. Based on the preferences shown in these polls, Lmdgren argues for
a change in what he referred to as the "default rule" in end-of-life situations. According to
Lindgren, the current default rule calls for physicians "to assume that the patient wants all
available treatments to preserve life, unless it can be clearly documented otherwise." Id.
at 187 (quoting Jack C. Siebe, The Patient'sChoice of Care:Suggested Hospital Policies,
inMEDICAL ETHIcs: A GUIDE FOR HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 417, 418 (John F Monagle &
David C. Thomasma eds., 1988)).
Lindgren argues that this default rule should be changed and that it "ought to be death

for at least some important classes of end-of-life situations." Id. at 196. He bases this
conclusion on his application of the principles of "[t]he two leading camps in default-rule
analysis
the philosophical school that seeks the intent of the parties, and the law and
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Unfortunately, very few people complete formal advance directives
memorializing their wishes. A United States General Accounting Office

report notes that estimates as to the number of individuals completing
formal advance directives vanes between ten and twenty-five percent (with

some estimates as low as five percent) of the adult population.'

A 1993

economics school that seeks sound social policy m the form of wealth or utility maximization." Id. at 196, 197-223.
Lindgren concedes that it is difficult to draw the line when the default rule m medical
situations - life - shifts to the default rule of death for end-of-life situations, but he
suggests that it can be drawn based on patient preferences as expressed in opinion polls.
Id. at 228. Specifically, he identifies eight overlapping situations in which the default rule
should be death:
(1) patients on life support who have no hope of recovery;
(2) patients in a coma with no brain activity being kept alive by a feeding tube;
(3) patients who are terminally ill or in irreversible coma, supported by lifesupport systems, including food and water;
(4) patients with an illness that makes them totally dependent on a family
member or other person for all of their care (a situation in which they would not
want their doctors "to do everything possible to save" life);
(5) patients with a disease with no hope of improvement suffering a great deal
of physical pain;
(6) patients in a coma with no hope of recovery but no pain;
(7) hopelessly ill or comatose patients on life support if their families request the
withdrawal of support; and
(8) permanently unconscious patients receiving food and water.
Id.
Lindgren's conclusion is criticized in an accompanying article by the Co-Reporter for
the Uniform Healthcare Decisions Act and Chair of the Committee on Healthcare Decisions,
ABA Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law. David M. English, Comment: Definng the Right to Die, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1993, at 255. English notes that
although poll data may suggest that terminally ill but conscious patients would want treatment terminated, "Itihere is no agreement on what is meant by a 'terminal illness.'" Id. at
258. He also observes that the average time between the onset of a final illness and death
is 29 months, and asks:
Is Lindgren suggesting that all treatment be stopped upon the first diagnosis?
Perhaps what he intends is that treatment should be terminated if the patient has
a "terminal illness" as defined in most living will statutes, which require either
that death be "imminent," or that death will occur within a "relatively short
time." Both questions raise interpretive questions, however, and would not
provide the certainty that Lindgren seeks.
Id. at 258-59 (citations omitted). English concludes, "Lindgren's proposal is attractive
because it gives the appearance of being a simple solution. But in this area of the law, there
can be no simple solutions." Id. at 259.
75. UNITED STATES GEN. ACCT. OFF., PuB. GAO/HEHS-95-135, PATIENT SELFDETERMINATION ACT: PROVIDERS OFFER INFORMATION ON ADVANCE DIRECTIVEs BUT
EFFECTIVENESS UNCERTAIN 8 (1995) [hereinafter USGAO].
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study by the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Health
and Human Services found that only eighteen percent of hospital patients
had advance directives, although fifty percent of patients in nursing facilities did.76 That same study reported that only nine percent of patients
under age turty had an advance directive, but thirty-five percent of those
over age seventy-five had one.'
A recent $28 million study (SUPPORT study) aimed at "improv[ing]
end-of-life decisionmakmg and reduc[ing] the frequency of a mechanically
supported, painful, and prolonged process of dying"' 8 confirmed patients'
desire to avoid artificial life-sustaining treatment.79 The study also found,
however, that this desire was often either not recognized or not honored.
The evidence demonstrated that "nearly half of the 960 phase I patients who
indicated a desire for CPR to be withheld did not have a DNR [do-notresuscitate] order written."' Phase I patients who died spent a median of
eight days either in an intensive care unit (ICU), receiving mechanical
ventilation, or in a comatose state. Additionally, "more than one-third
(38%) spent at least 10 days m ICU, and 46% received mechanical ventilation within 3 days of death."8" After a phase I patient's death, interviews
with "surrogates indicated that 50% of all the conscious phase I patients
who died in the hospital experienced moderate or severe pam at least half
the time during their last three days of life. "I

76. Id. at 9; see also Martha Terry & Steven Zweig, Prevalence of Advance Directives
and Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders in Community Nursing Facilities, 3 ARcHimv FAM. MED.
141, 141 (1994) (reporting that study of eight rural community nursing facilities found that
less than one-third of patients had advance directives).
77 USGAO, supra note 75, at 9.
78. SUPPORT Principal Investigatorsi A ControlledTrialto Improve Carefor Seriously Ill Hospitalized Patients: The Study to UnderstandPrognosesand Preferencesfor
Outcomes..and Risks of Treatments (SUPPORT), 274 JAMA 1591, 1591 (1995).
79. Id. at 1594. The SUPPORT investigation was divided into two phases. Phase I
was a perspective observation study that "documented shortcomings in communication,
frequency of aggressive treatment, and the characteristics of hospital death." Id. at 1591.
Phase If was a cluster randomized, controlled clinical trial aimed at improvmg communication between physicians, patients, and families. Id. at 1592. The study covered patients
who "were m the advanced stages of one or more of nine illnesses: acute respiratory failure,
multiple organ system failure with sepsis, multiple organ system failure with malignancy,
coma, chromc obstructive lung disease, congestive heart failure, cirrhosis, metastatic colon
cancer, and non-small cell lung cancer." Id.
80. Id. at 1594.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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B. PhysicianResistance to Advance Directives
The results of tius study may be due in part to physician resistance to
advance directives.' A study of physicians m California and Vermont"
identified three reasons for physician failure to honor patients' advance
directives regarding the withholding of treatment: "(1) fear of liability;
(2) the perception that directives interpose an unnecessary additional control
over, and interfere with, the physicians' professional actions; and (3) the
83. An editorial on the SUPPORT project noted that:
Reports of patient preferences from the SUPPORT intervention nurses had little
effect on attending physicians. Physicians acknowledged receiving these reports
in only 34% of cases. We can only speculate why the intervention failed to
improve physicians' appreciation of patients' preferences. Did physicians regard
patients' preferences as unimportant? Did physicians believe that they already
knew what patients wanted, even though studies show that physicians cannot
accurately predict patients' wishes? Did physicians place little value on mformation communicated by the intervention nurses, compared with information they
obtained firsthand?
Bernard Lo, Editorial, Improving Care Near the End of Life: Why Is It So Hard?, 274
JAMA 1634, 1635 (1995) (citation omitted).
While the editorial offered no answers to these questions, earlier studies show that
both physicians and nurses often maccurately predict the patient's preference regarding
resuscitation. For example, one study shows that eight of twenty-five patients who had been
resuscitated had not wanted CPR and did not want it in the future. Only one of the sixteen
doctors caring for these patients, however, believed that they did not wish to be resuscitated.
Susanna E. Bedell & Thomas L. Delbanco, Choices about CardioPulmonaryResuscitation
in the Hospital, 310 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1089, 1091 (1984). The study concluded that
"physicians are more likely to recognize the preferences of patients who desire resuscitation
than preferences of those who do not." Id. at 1092; see also Richard F Uhlmann et al.,
UnderstandingofElderly Patients'Resuscitation Preferencesby Physiciansand Nurses, 150
W I. MED. 705, 705 (1989) (reporting that agreement between what patients actually
wanted and what health care professionals thought patients wanted for variety of lifesustaining treatments ranged from 59% to 84% for physicians and from 53% to 78% for
nurses).
Lo's editorial also noted a more troubling problem:
[E]ven when physicians knew a patient's preferences, the physicians may have
disregarded them as uninformed or not in the patient's best interests. No data
are reported on another important issue, the preferences of the patients who died
after prolonged periods in the ICU or receiving mechamcal ventilation. Did
these patients (or their surrogates) understand their prognosis, and did they really
want these aggressive interventions started or continued so long?
Lo, supra, at 1635.
84. Joel M. Zinberg, Decisionsfor the Dying: An Empirical Study of Physicians
Responses to Advance Directives, 13 VT. L. REV 445, 452 (1989). The author, a physi
cian/attorney, interviewed 18 physicians in Vermont and 39 physicians in and around Lo:
Angeles concerning their experiences with and understanding of advance directives. Id.
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perception that directives implicitly question the physicians' judgment of the
patients' best mterest."8'
Another recent article reviewing trends m health care decisionmaking
shows that physician ambivalence towards advance directives still exists:
The evidence suggests that.physicians generally still consider it their
responsibility to make treatment decisions that they believe are m the
patient's best interest and that patient preferences should be ignored if
they are inconsistent with the physician's view of the patient's best
interests. In other words, it appears that end-of-life decisions are
frequently driven by the physician's values rather than the patient's
values. 1
85. Id. at 482. Other studies have also found that fear of liability affects physicians'
willingness to follow advance directives which ask that life-sustaining treatment be withheld.
See Renee M. Goetzler & Mark A. Moskowitz, Changes in Physician Attitudes Toward
Limiting Care of Critically Ill Patients, 151 ARcHivEs INTERNAL MED. 1537, 1538 (1991)
(finding that physicians were concerned about malpractice liability m deciding how to treat
critically ill patients). This fear exists even though major medical journals have informed
doctors that "[nlo person has ever been found liable for withdrawing life-sustaining treatment without court permission." David Orentlicher, The Right to Die After Cruzan, 264
JAMA 2444, 2446 (1990); see also Alan Meisel, Legal Myths About Terminating Life
Support, 151 ARcHivEs INTERNAL MED. 1497, 1497-98 (1991); Robert F Weir & Larry
Gostin, Decisions to Abate Life-Sustaining Treatment for Nonautonomous Patients, 264
JAMA 1846, 1852 (1990) ("Every court of final decision in every jurisdiction that has
addressed the question of physician liability
has found physicians participating in the
cases to be free from civil or criminal sanctions."). In addition, all state living will and
health care proxy statutes confer some sort of rnimunity from civil or criminal liability or
both on health care providers who m good faith comply with a properly executed living will
or the instructions of a proxy acting m accordance with the patient's wishes or m the
patient's best interest. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7190.5(b) (West Supp.
1996) (discussing living will); CAL. PROB. CODE § 4750 (West Supp. 1996) (discussing
proxy). See generally 2 MEISEL, supra note 11, §§ 11.17, 12.40, at 111-12, 196-97 (citing
living will and proxy statutes).
Fear of liability, though, is but one reason for physicians to ignore patients' wishes.
Zinberg also reports:
One interviewee volunteered that a substantial number of his colleagues dislike
directives because they believe directives would curtail doctors' control of
treatment. This observation is partially confirmed by the fact that many interviewees strongly opposed the interposition of formal ethics committees. Only
three interviewees in each state agreed that other physicians or an ethics committee should be consulted.
Zinberg, supranote 84, at 482-83 (citations omitted).
86. David Orentlicher, The Limitations of Legislation, 53 MD. L. REV 1255, 1281
(1994) (citation omitted) [hereinafter Orentlicher, The Limitations of Legislation]. Orentlicher cited several studies in support of his thesis. Id. at 1281-87 For example, one study
concluded that physicians often overrode living wills when they disagreed with the patients'
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C. FinancialIncentives to Treat?
It is not surprising then that a newspaper article on the SUPPORT
study stated that the study "calls into question a central tenet of the 25-yearold right-to-die movement: that if patients express their wishes about endof-life care in advance through such documents as living wills, doctors will
abide by them."'
The article quoted Joanne Lynn, the director of the
choices, including providing undesired treatment when they felt that the treatment was
appropriate. Id. at 1281-82; see Marion Danis et al., A Prospective Study of Advance
Directivesfor Life-Sustaining Care, 324 NEw ENG. J.MED. 882, 886-87 (1991); see also
DANIEL CALLAHAN, SETTING LIMITS: MEDICAL GOALS INAN AGING SOCIETY 175 (1987)
("A continuing problem with 'living wills' has been the unwillingness of many physicians
to honor them
"); Panagiota V Caralis & Jeffrey S. Hammond, Attitudes of Medical
Students, Housestaff and Faculty Physicians Toward Euthanasiaand Termination of LifeSustaming Treatment, 20 CRmTICAL CARE MED. 683, 686-89 (1992); David Orentlicher, The
Illusion of Patient Choice in End-of-Life Decisions, 267 JAMA 2101, 2101-04 (1992).
The existence of physician resistance to living wills has also been a source of concern
for the nurses who work with them. Two nursing journals have discussed nurses' responsibilities when physicians fail to honor patient wishes. Barbara Springer Edwards, When a
Living Will Is Ignored, AM. J. NURSING, July 1994, at 64; Cindy Hylton Rushton, What Can
a Nurse Do When the Patient Has an Advance Directive and the PhysicianDisregardsIt?,
CRmCAL CAPE NURSE, Feb. 1993, at 61.
Other studies have found that advance directives are often ignored because they never
make it into the patient's hospital charts. One study investigating the accessibility of
previously executed advance directives by 114 geriatric patients found that out of a total of
180 hospital admissions over a three-year period, documentation of the advance directive
appeared m only 47 (26%) of the charts. R. Sean Morrison et al., The Inaccessibilityof
Advance Directives on Transferfrom Ambulatory to Acute Care Settings, 274 JAMA 478,
479-80 (1995). Only 29 of those charts contained an actual copy of the advance directive.
Id. at 480.
The study also found that m 39 of 53 (74%) admissions in which patients did not have
decisional capacity, the advance directive was not recognized nor was there written documentation of any attempt to discern if such a directive had been previously executed. Id.,
see also USGAO, supra note 75, at 13 (noting that 1992 survey found that only 60% of
patients with advance directives had copies with their medical charts and another study found
that while advance directives were with nursing home charts for 74% of patients transferred
to hospital, "the document was successfully delivered to the hospital and incorporated into
the hospital record for only about one-third of the cases"); Cynthia J. Stolman et al.,
Evaluation of Patient, Physician, Nurse, and Family Attitudes Toward Do Not Resuscitate
Orders, 150 ARcHrvES INTERNAL MED. 653, 655 (1990) (reporting that in study of compe-

tent patients with DNR orders, existence of living will was recorded in patients' records in
only 6 of 24 patients and only 10 physicians were aware of patients' living wills).
87 Don Colburn, The Grace of a "GoodDeath" EscapesMany; Despite Living Wills
and Other Innovations,Doctors Often Ignore or Don't Know Patients Wishes, WASH. POST,
Dec. 5,1995, at Z7 Dr. William Knaus, one of the researchers who directed the study,
made a similar statement to the New York Times: "People think advance directives are
solving the problem
We have very good information that they aren't, that nothing has
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Center to Improve Care of the Dying at George Washington University
Medical Center and a coleader of the SUPPORT study Lynn stated that
one of the problems with the current system is that "it does not hold itself
accountable for badly handled deaths. 'If I, as a doctor, do it badly, nothing comes down on me.
I get paid well. The family is left behind m
grief and goes away

The patient's suffering counts for nothing.""

The existence of financial incentives to continue treatment for a patient
on life-support systems was addressed by both the majority and the dissent
m Grace Plaza of GreatNeck, Inc. v Elbaum. 9 Grace Plaza, a long-term
care facility, admitted Jean Elbaum on September 19, 1986 following hos-

pital treatment for a stroke.' When Grace Plaza admitted Elbaum, she
received nutrition through a gastrostomy tube and was in a persistent vegetative state. 91 In October 1987, Elbaum's husband sent a letter to Grace

Plaza stating that "it was his wife's wish that she be allowed to die naturally
changed - the amount of pamn at the end of life, the number of people dying alone attached
to machmes." Susan Gilbert, Study Finds Doctors Refuse Patients' Requests on Death, N.Y
TIMEs, Nov 22, 1995, at Al.
88. Colburn, supra note 87, at Z7 Dr. Bernard Lo, Director of the Program of
Medical'Ethics at the University of California at San Francisco, also noted that "doctors had
strong financial incentives to put patients m intensive care rather than to sit down and talk
with them about alternatives, like dying with pam relief at home." Gilbert, supra note 87,
at Al. Lo stated: "Invasive procedures are reunbursed at a higher rate than sitting down
and talking to patients." Id.
Legal commentators have also remarked on the potential problems caused by the
current system, which favors treatment over nontreatment. See, e.g., Orentlicher, The
Limitationsof Legislation, supra note 86, at 1275-76. Orentlicher stated:
Physicians are not inherently unwilling to take the time needed for sufficient
discussion [of end-of-life decisions]. However, under current [insurance] policies, they do not receive any compensation for the time spent. Health insurance
policies consider such discussions either nonreunbursable, or reimbursable at
very low rates. Unless physicians are compensated for their time discussing endof-life decisions, they will continue to allocate their time to activities that generate higher compensation.
Id., see Addlestone, supra note 17, at 1263. Addlestone states:
The potential moral hazard facing health care providers if they are not-held
accountable for failing to comply with patient wishes
should affect the balance between physician and patient autonomy If not subject to liability, hospitals or other providers may prolong patient care, consciously or unconsciously,
to generate increased revenues.
Id.
89. 588 N.Y.S.2d 853 (App. Div 1992).
90. Grace Plaza of Great Neck, Inc. v Elbaum, 588 N.Y.S.2d 853, 853 (App. Div.
1992), af4'd, 623 N.E.2d 513 (N.Y 1993).
91. Grace Plaza of Great Neck, Inc. v Elbaum, 623 N.E.2d 513, 514 (N.Y 1993).
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should she fall into an 'irreversible vegetative state""'9 and instructed Grace

Plaza to remove Mrs. Elbaum's feeding tube.'
Grace Plaza responded to Mr. Elbaum by noting the absence of a clear
indication of Mrs. Elbaum's wishes regarding removal of her feeding
tube.94 Grace Plaza also stated that "its own ethical standards would
prohibit it from withdrawing life-saving medical treatment from one of its
patients"' and encouraged Mr. Elbaum to transfer his wife to another
nursing home if he wanted her feeding tube removed.'
Mr. Elbaum refused to pay for any further treatment, and Grace Plaza
sued to recover payments for services rendered to his wife after October
1987 91 Mr. Elbaum then sued Grace Plaza to remove Mrs. Elbaum's feedmg tube. 98 The trial court initially held that there was insufficient evidence
that Mrs. Elbaum wanted the feeding tube removed, 99 but an appellate court
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Elbaum, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 855.
95. Id.
96. Id. In a letter to Mr. Elbaum dated February 16, 1988, Grace Plaza's admmistrator wrote:
At this time, we have not been provided with clear indication of the patient's
wishes at a time when she was competent. However, please be aware that even
ifirrefutable evidence of the patient's wishes wereforthcoming, Grace Plaza is
not willing to undertake removal of the gastrostomytube, and we believe that we
have the right under New York State law'to refuse to do so. The goal of this
facility is to preserve life, and we will not willingly take actions inconsistent with
this position.
[W]e have attempted to find another facility which would accommodate you, but we have been unsuccessful. However, we remain willing to assist
you with Mrs. Elbaum's transfer to any facility you name, or to your home
where Mrs. Elbaum's needs can be met by appropriate home care.
In the interim, and for the duration of her stay here, we expect payment as
per the admissions contract. At this point, you are m arrears for the months of
November, 1987 through February, 1988. If payment m the amount of $18,576
is not received within 10 days of receipt of this letter, we will be forced to
initiate actions for recovery of these funds, and delivery of the patient to your
care. You may be aware that New York State regulation sanctions the discharge
of a patient for non-payment.
Id. at 863 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting).
97 Id. at 855. The record did not reveal any effort on Mr. Elbaum's part to locate
an alternative nursing home, and Grace Plaza's efforts were unsuccessful because other
facilities "would not admit the patient for the purpose of removing the tube." Id.
98. Elbaum v. Grace Plaza of Great Neck, Inc., 544 N.Y.S.2d 840, 843 (App. Div
1989), aft'd, 623 N.E.2d 513 (N.Y 1993).
99. Id. at 845.
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reversed and ordered Grace Plaza either to transfer Mrs. Elbaum to a
nursing home that would enforce her wishes or to enforce them itself."°
Following this decision, Mrs. Elbaum was discharged from Grace Plaza and
died shortly thereafter."'1
Grace Plaza's payment action continued after her death, and Mr.
Elbaum argued that he rightfully refused to pay because the nursing home
should have stopped the treatment as soon as he told them that his wife
would not have wanted artificial nutrition and hydration." He further
argued that continuing to furmsh the nutrition and hydration constituted a
battery against his wife."1 3 The appellate division disagreed:
The rule which prevents physicians from recovering payment for medical
services wich are not desired should not be applied in a case where,
because the patient is comatose, her desires cannot be known, but can
only be deduced, with a greater or lesser degree of certainty, from
evidence of her past conduct and past statements. 104
More specifically, the court held that:
[U]nder the law as it stood at the time this case arose, [Grace Plaza]
committed no legal wrong, incurred no legal liability, and forfeited no
legal right, when, in the absence of judicial guidance, it continued to
provide life-saving medical treatment to a comatose patient over the
objections of the patient's conservator."1 '
Prior to reaching this holding, the court addressed the moral hazard
argument:
It is asserted that, in light of our decision today, all health care
providers in charge of competent patients will have an additional financial
incentive to prolong the lives of such patients over the objections of the
patients' families. This may be true, and the potential evil which we see
is that some beleaguered families may, regrettably, be forced to
litigation
What is not noted is that, if Mr. Elbaum's conduct in
this case were condoned, health care providers would have an additional
financial incentive to obey, without question, the orders of those conservators who might prematurely despair of their conservatees' recovery, or
the orders of those conservators whose judgment might be tainted by
motives less altruistic than Mr. Elbaum's. The potential evil we see
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 848.
Elbaum, 623 N.E.2d at 514 n.*
Elbaum, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 856.
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 860.
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resulting from this, i.e., the possible death of one patient whose life
might have been saved, is infinitely greater, m our view 106
Judge Rosenblatt, in dissent, strongly disagreed with this statement.
He stated that the court's ruling "allow[ed] a nursing home to profit
financially, while ignoring a patient's wishes, as it imposes its own ethical
standards upon her."'17
106. Id.
107 Id. at 861 (Rosenblatt,. J., dissenting). Judge Rosenblatt further noted that the
court had previously held that Orace Plaza had "ignored Mr. Elbaum's demands while
simultaneously missting upon payment for their undesired services." Id. at 862 (Rosenblatt,
J., dissenting) (quoting Elbaum v. Grace Plaza of Great Neck, Inc., 544 N.Y.S.2d 840, 847
(App. Div 1989)).
New York's high court avoided directly addressing the moral hazard question m
affirming the appellate division. It noted that it had previously required the families of
patients unable to express their wishes concerning continuing care to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that the patient had previously expressed a clear and settled wish that
care not be continued. See Elbaum, 623 N.E.2d at 515 (citing In re Westchester County
Med. Ctr. (O'Connor), 531 N.E.2d 607, 613 (N.Y. 1988)). The court stated: "If a provider
harbors some uncertainty on the matter, it acts within the dictates of O'Connor if it refuses
to discontinue treatment until the issue is legally determined. By doing so, it does not
breach a contract of care nor impair its right to be paid for services rendered." Id. (citations omitted). The court concluded:
If the provider refuses to act, we find nothing unfair in placing the burden of
instituting legal proceedings on those seeking to discontinue treatment. Though
the provider has a legal duty to adhere to the known wishes of a patient, a desire
to terminate life support does not stand on the same legal footing as a patient's
request for a routine change in treatment.
O'Connorinstructs decision-makers to "err on the side of life" and makes
clear that the burden of establishing an incompetent patient's desire to die rests
squarely with those who are asserting that desire.
Id. at 515-16 (citing In re Westchester County Med. Ctr. (O'Connor), 531 N.E.2d 607, 613
(N.Y 1988)).
Two other appellate courts have also allowed nursing homes to recover for unwanted
treatment, at least during the time it takes to obtain judicial permission to terminate lifesustaining treatment. See First Healthcare Corp. v Rettinger, 467 S.E.2d 243, 244 (N.C.
1996) (per curam), rev'g 456 S.E.2d 347 (N.C. App. 1995); Leach v Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d
1047, 1053-55 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
One commentator writing after the appellate division's ruling m Elbaum was critical
of this approach. See Gasner, supra note 17, at 514. Gasner noted:
Permitting payment for unwanted treatment provides a serious disincentive to
honor patient choice. Families are often reluctant to initiate court cases because
of the emotional and financial burden. If the provider is allowed to treat now,
and decide later whether it was appropriate, and get paid in the interim, there is
little incentive to expedite the court proceedings. There is every incentive to
delay taking the requests of the family seriously because stalling financially
benefits the provider.
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III. Wrongful Living, Wrongful Life: Can Plaintiffs
with DisabilitiesRecover Damages When They Argue That
They Would Be Better Off Dead?
The lack of accountability for failure to honor advance directives has
led some commentators to call for the imposition of civil liability when a
health care provider violates a patient's wish either to end or never to begin
life-sustaining treatment."0 8 One writer suggested that a "successful suit of
this type might be more effective than legislation in encouraging physicians
to take 'living wills' seriously "109
Id. at 514 (citations omitted).
Gasner further argued:
As a matter of law, it makes sense that once the family withholds consent to
treatment, the provider must go to court to receive permission to continue that
treatment. In a judicial hearing, the court can determine whether there is legally
sufficient evidence that the patient would not consent to the treatment. If the
evidence supports the surrogate decisionmaker's directions, then the treatment
never gets started. The patient dies according to her wishes and there is no problem of nonpayment. In contrast, if the evidence is insufficient, the facility will get
legal permission to treat, and payment will be required thereafter.
Such a system guarantees that the provider will only go to court for those
cases in which there is serious reason to question the sufficiency of the evidence.
Few families will want to be hauled into court if they cannot prove that they are
acting consistently with the patient's wishes. Most families will consent to the
treatment before subjecting themselves to a court hearing and incurring legal fees.
Id. at 513-14 (citations omitted).
108. See generally Gasner, supra note 17; Knapp & Hamilton, supra note 18; David H.
Miller, Right-to-Die Damage Actions: Developments in the Law, 65 DENY U. L. REV 181
(1988); Willard H. Pedrick, Arizona Tort Law and Dignified Death, 22 ARIz. ST. L.J. 63
(1990) [hereinafter Pedrick, Arizona Tort Law]; Willard H. Pedrick, DignifiedDeath and the
Law of Torts, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV 387 (1991); Addlestone, supra note 17; Richard P
Dooling, Comment, Damage Actions for Nonconsensual Life-Sustaintng Medical Treatment,
30 ST. Louis U. L.J. 895 (1986); Hackelman, supra note 18; see also Gregory G. Sarno,
Annotation, Tortious Maintenance or Removal of Life Supports, 58 A.L.R. 4TH 222 (1987 &
Supp. 1995).
109. George J. Annas, Reconciling Qumilan and Saikewicz: Decision Malang for the
Terminally Ill Incompetent, 4 AM. J. L. & MED. 367, 386 n.48 (1979), quoted in Dooling,
supra note 108, at 898. A few living will statutes do expressly provide the basis for a civil
cause of action, but either limit the damages available or require that the health care provider's
refusal to follow the advance directive be in bad faith. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.070(a)
(Michie 1994) (allowing "civil penalty not to exceed $1,000 plus the actual costs associated
with the failure to comply with the order or declaration, and this shall be the exclusive remedy
at law"); NEB. REV STAT. ANN. § 20-402(1) (Michie 1995) ("Unjustifiable violation of a
patient's direction shall be a civil cause of action maintainable by the patient or the patient's
next of kin. Remedy m law and equity may be granted by a court of competent jurisdiction.");
TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-108(a) (Supp. 1996) ("Any health care provider who fails to make
good faith reasonable efforts to comply with the preceding procedure as prescribed by the
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To date, in the majority of suits seeking damages for the unauthorized
provision of life-sustaining treatment, plaintiffs have relied on traditional

common-law torts such as battery and infliction of emotional distress or on
a constitutional tort under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.110 There has also been a call,
however, for the recognition of a new tort: wrongful living.
A. Wrongful Living: Interference with the Right to Die
1. Wrongful Living Defined
A wrongful living cause of action was first proposed in a law review
article published a decade after the recognition of the right to die in Quinlan and in California's Natural Death Act."' Oddi argued that:
attending physician shall be civilly liable and subject to professional disciplinary action.
").
Section 10 of the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act (UHCDA) includes a provision on
"statutory damages." UNIF HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 10, 9 U.L.A. 242 (West Supp.
1996). Damages are available only for an intentional violation of the act and can range from
$500 to "actual damages resulting from the violation, whichever is greater, plus reasonable
attorney's fees." Id. A comment to the section indinates that the drafters chose civil damages
rather than criminal penalties "out of a recognition that prosecutions are unlikely to occur."
Id. They also indicate that the statutory damages "do not supersede but are in addition to
remedies available under other law." Id. at 243. This section of the UHCDA has been
adopted by Maine and New Mexico. ME. REV STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-810 (West Supp.
1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-10 (Michie Supp. 1996).
Two commentators have suggested that the Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA) might
give rise to a cause of action when a hospital fails to inform a patient of his rights under state
law or of its policy regarding the removal of life support. See Gasner, supra note 17, at 518;
Addlestone, supra note 17, at 1278-79. The only case to date on the issue, however, held that
the PSDA does not include a private right of action. See Anselin v. Shawnee Mission Med.
Ctr., 894 F Supp. 1479, 1485 (D. Kan. 1995).
Some states provide a criminal penalty for health care providers who refuse to comply
with an advance directive and fail to transfer a patient to a facility where treatment will be
withdrawn, but such a failure must be willful or in bad faith. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17209(a) (Michie 1991) (stating action as misdemeanor); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 7191(a) (West Supp. 1996) (same); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-206(1) (1995) (same); NEB.
REV STAT. ANN. § 20-411(1) (Michle 1995) (stating action as class I nusdemeanor); NEv
REv STAT. ANN. § 449.660(1) (Michie 1995) (stating action as gross misdemeanor). Other
states classify the failure to comply with a directive as unprofessional conduct allowing state
licensing authorities to penalize a health care provider. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2427(b)
(1995); HAW. REV STAT. § 327D-11(c) (Supp. 1992); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.045(1) (West
1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2_H-78 (West 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3101.11 (West
Supp. 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.11-9(a) (Supp. 1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-100
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-108(a) (Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 75-2-1112(3) (1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 154.07(1)(a)(3) (West Supp. 1995).
110. See Gasner, supra note 17, at 504-12 (discussing theories advanced in cases seeking
damages for failure to honor patients' refusal of treatment); Addlestone, supra note 17, at
1267-72 (same).
111. Oddi, supra note 18, at 637
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Once it has been established that a person hasthe right to die, medical
personnel who imght otherwise be under a duty to act on behalf of that
person are not only relieved of that duty but also restrained by a
diametrically opposite duty not to interfere with that person's right to die.
Either intentional or negligent interference with the right to die would constitute a breach of that duty 112
Oddi first discussed possible actions based on such a breach under
traditional tort concepts:
If the treatment was intentional and with knowledge that the person assertmg the right to die had withheld consent, the tort of battery would obviously lie. Absent an intent to override the patient's wishes, there is also
the possibility that one could negligently breach a duty not to treat where
the party providing the treatment should have known of the patient's
refusal to be treated. "I
Oddi continued, however, to identify a new tort:
Whether the interfering treatment is conducted with or without due care is
irrelevant, except insofar as such treatment prolongs the life of the
individual contrary to the right to die. If the interfering treatment is made
and the patient lives, then interference with the right to die involves compensationfor living. This is a "wrongful living" cause of action.114
112. Id., see also Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., 671 N.E.2d 225, 227 (Ohio
1996) ("[In a 'wrongful living' action, the plaintiff is asserting a liberty interest in refusing
unwanted medical treatment. It is the denial of this liberty interest, when the medical
professional either negligently or intentionally disregards the express wishes of a patient, that
gives rise to the wrongful living cause of action.").
113. Oddi, supra note 18, at 636.
114. Id. at 641 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Oddi argued that this tort is a
personal one and may be redressed by the person whose right to die is interfered with or, if
they die, by their representative on a survival basis. Id. at 642. He later stated:
In a personal or survival action, the loss to the patient asserting the right to die is the
prolongationof life. Expressed m terms of causation, the question becomes: But for
the
interference with the right to die, that is, the rendering of treatment, was the
life of the patient prolonged? Whether the treatment was rendered in a negligent or
skillful manner is irrelevant, except with regard to how that reflects on the damages
issue. Thus, the measure of damages should be reflected inhow long the life was
prolonged after the time when death would be expected to occur had no treatment
been rendered.
Id. at 661 (emphasis added); see also Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 227 The Anderson court
noted:
For purposes of a "wrongful living" cause of action, the event or loss for which the
plaintiff seeks damages is neither death nor life but the prolongationof life. Thus,
once it is established that but for the conduct of the medical professional, death would
have resulted, the causation element for a "wrongful living" claim is satisfied.
Id. (emphasis added).
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In his article, Oddi declared that Estate of Leach v Shapiro"5 could
be categorized as an action for wrongful living." 6 On July 27, 1980,
Akron General Medical Center admitted Edna Marie Leach, who was
suffering from respiratory distress."' She later went into cardio-pulmonary
arrest, and the medical center resuscitated her."' Leach was in a chronic
vegetative state following her resuscitation, and on August 1, 1980, the
medical center placed Leach on life-support systems." 9 On October 21,
1980, Leach's husband, as her guardian, filed a petition asking to terminate
The order to terminate life-support was issued on
the life support."
December 18, 1980.121 On January 6, 1981, the medical center disconnected the respirator, and Leach died.'2
On July 9, 1982, Leach's estate and members of her family filed an
action seeking damages for the time Leach was on life-support systems."z
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had acted wrongfully in placing
her on life support and continuing treatment contrary to the express wishes
of Leach and her family 124 The plaintiffs claimed that Leach was in a
chrome vegetative state when the medical center first placed her on life
support on August 1, 1980, that Leach had expressly advised the defendants
that she did not wish to be kept alive by machines, and that the medical
center performed this treatment without her consent or that of her family 1
Citing Lacey v Laird," the Leach court concluded that "a physician
who treats a patient without consent commits a battery, even though the
procedure is harmless or beneficial."' 27 The court then went on to state:
While the patient's right to refuse treatment is qualified because it may be
overbor[el by competing state interests, we believe that, absent legislation
to the contrary, the patient's right to refuse treatment is absolute until the
quality of the competing interests is weighed in a court proceeding. We
115. 469 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
116. Oddi, supra note 18, at 648.
117 Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047, 1051 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
118. Id. at 1052.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1051.
121. Leach v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr., 426 N.E.2d 809, 809 (Ohio Ct. C.P 1980).
122. Estate of Leach, 469 N.E.2d at 1051.
123. Id. at 1051.
124. Id. at 1051-52.
125. Id. at 1052.
126. 139 N.E.2d 25 (Ohio 1956).
127 Estate of Leach, 469 N.E.2d at 1051 (citing Lacey v. Laird, 139 N.E.2d 25, 28
(Ohio 1956)).
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perceive this right as the logical extension of the consent requirement and
conclude that apatient may recoverfor battery if his refusal is ignored.'2
The court recognized that "doctors must be free to exercise their best
medical judgment m treating a life-threatening emergency," 12 9 but stated that
"[c]arned to its extreme
the doctrine of implied consent could
effectively nullify those privacy rights recognized m In re Qumnlan, Eichner; Saikewcz; and Leach since a physician could circumvent the express
wishes of a terminal patient by waiting to act until the patient was comatose
and critical."130 The court decided that the merits of the plaintiffs' claims
depended upon facts to be developed in the case, including the existence
and nature of any consent or refusal of treatment; the nature of the treatments before August 1, 1980; Leach's condition on that date; and the
nature of the treatment on and after August 1, 1980.131 Given these factual
questions, the court ruled that the trial court had erred m dismissing the
battery complaint. 32 The court also ruled that there were factual questions
regarding the plaintiffs' efforts to recover for pamn, suffering, and mental
anguish for Leach and for themselves. 33 The court found the plaintiffs'
claims valid to the extent that they could prove that the failure to remove
Leach from life support caused pain and suffering beyond that which Leach
normally would have suffered from her condition. 'I
Oddi argued that Leach could be categorized as an action for wrongful
living because:
[B]ut for the unauthorized treatment of Mrs. Leach on the life-support system, she would have died naturally The unauthorized treatment resulted
in the prolongation of the life of a patient who had the right to die
naturally without unauthorized treatment. Damages are thus appropriate
on a survival basisfor the time period that the patient survived due to the
interfering treatment.'5
128. Id. at 1051-52 (emphasis added).
129. Id. at 1053 (citations omitted).
130. Id. (citations omitted).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1054.
133. Id. at 1055.
134. Id.
135. Oddi, supra note 18, at 648 (emphasis added). Oddi also cited the case of Holmes
v. Silver Cross Hospital, 340 F Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill. 1972), as being representative of a
wrongful living case. Oddi, supra note 18, at 645-47 The action before the Holmes court,
however, did not seek compensation for living following unauthorized life-sustaining treatment.
Indeed, the patient died despite the unauthorized treatment. Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp.,
340 F Supp. 125, 128 (N.D. Ill. 1972). Instead, the question was whether doctors and a
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2. Wrongful Ltvng Cases

a. Anderson v St. Francis-St. George Hospital
An Ohio appellate court citing Leach and Oddi, however, has twice
rejected the wrongful living cause of action, m decisions subsequently aphospital had violated a patient's First Amendment right to free exercise of religion by forcing
him to undergo blood transfusions even though they knew it was against his religious prmcipies. Id.
In Holmes, a 20-year-old man was admitted to a hospital following an accident. Id. at
128. While still fully conscious and competent, he told the doctors that his religious beliefs
precluded him from receiving blood transfusions. Id. The doctors then unsuccessfully
attempted to persuade other members of his family that a transfusion was medically necessary.
Id. All of his relatives also refused to authorize the transfusions on religious grounds, and
both Holmes and his wife signed a form releasing the hospital and doctors from liability if they
were to perform surgery without any transfusions. Id.
When Holmes lost consciousness, however, the hospital petitioned a court to declare him
incompetent as a minor and to appoint a conservator who would consent to the transfusions.
Id. The court granted this request, and the conservator authorized the transfusions. Id.
Holmes died despite the transfusions; there was no claim that his death was m any way caused
by them, however. Id.
Holmes's widow brought an action against the doctors and the hospital under the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, charging that the defendants violated Holmes's civil
rights by treating him m a manner inconsistent with his religious beliefs while acting under
color of state law. Id. at 127-28. The court noted that this issue had not been definitely
settled by the Supreme Court or the Seventh Circuit and reviewed decisions from other courts
on the issue, as well as the Supreme Court's decisions relating to the Free Exercise Clause.
Id. It concluded that "a state-appointed conservator's ordering of medical treatment for a
person m violation of his religious beliefs, no matter how well intentioned the conservator may
be, violates the First Amendment's freedom of exercise clause m the absence of some
substantial state interests." Id. at 130. Given the lack of evidence on such a state interest in
the case before it, the court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. Id.
The Holnes court also denied the defendants' motion to dismiss based on a lack of state
action. Id. Noting that the hospital was subject to pervasive state regulations concerning its
operations, the court found that its actions were under color of state law for purposes of
§ 1983. Id. at 132-33. It further found that a factual question remained concerning whether
the doctors were acting as agents of the hospital and could, therefore, also be held liable under
§ 1983. Id. at 134-35.
At least one court, however, has rejected a § 1983 claim for disregarding a patient's
refusal of treatment based on a lack of state action. See Ross v. Hilltop Rehabilitation Hosp.,
676 F Supp. 1528, 1530 (D. Colo. 1987). The Ross decision is m line with the majority of
case law on whether a private hospital can be deemed a state actor. One commentator noted
that "courts have consistently held that the actions of a private hospital do not constitute state
action unless the state is significantly involved with specific hospital activity that is the subject
of the plaintiff's complaint." Sidney Summers, Note, Medical Staff Credentialing:Physician
Challenges to Board Certification Criteria, 18 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 673, 686 (1995).
Summers provides a brief listing of case law in the area. See id. at 886-87 For a more
comprehensive look at case law on whether a hospital can be held a state actor, see Annotation, Action of Private Hospital as State Action Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Fourteenth
Amendment, 42 A.L.R. FED. 463 (1979 & Supp. 1995).
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proved by the Ohio Supreme Court.'36 In Anderson, the admimstrator of
Edward H. Winter's estate sued St. Francis-St. George Hospital (SFSG),
claiming that SFSG was liable for resuscitating Winter despite the presence
of a do-not-resuscitate order.137
On May 25, 1988, SFSG admitted Winter, who complained of chest
13
pains and fainted after losing consciousness at a semor citizens' center. 1
Winter, eighty-two years old, had suffered two previous heart attacks and
endured chromc heart disease and other health problems.' While m the
hospital, Winter discussed the type of treatment he was to receive with his
family doctor, George Russo. Winter was competent and alert during this
conversation, and Dr. Russo understood Winter to mean that "he wanted
no extraordinary life-saving measures in the event of further illness."'" In
addition, Winter's daughter told Dr. Russo of a conversation with her father
concerning life-saving measures that had been performed on Winter's wife
and resulted in "great misery and suffering for the remainder of her life.""'
During Mrs. Winter's hospital stay, her heart was shocked and her chest
beaten while in intensive care, and Winter's daughter told Dr. Russo that
Winter was very upset about these actions. Winter subsequently told his
daughter "never to let anybody do that to him. "142 As a result of this discussion, Dr. Russo entered an instruction in the hospital record: "No Code
Blue. "14
On May 28, 1988, Winter suffered a ventricular fibrillation, a type of
irregular heartbeat that may be quickly fatal.""4 A nurse, apparently
unaware of the no-code-blue order, resuscitated Winter using defibrilla136. Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., 614 N.E.2d 841, 843 (Ohio Ct. App.
1992), appeal after remand, No. C-930819, 1995 WL 109128 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 15,
1995), rev'd, 671 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1996).
137 Id.
138. Id.
139. Anderson, 1995 WL 109128, at *1.

140. Id.
141.

Id.

142. Id. at *5 n.1.
143. Anderson, 614 N.E.2d at 843. Dr. Russo defined a "no code blue" order m his
deposition testimony:
Well, m my mind, a no code blue order is an organized process of resuscitating a
patient and anything that would initiate that or any procedure that would be, that
would occur during that process would be a resuscitative procedure, whether you

whap them on the chest or whether you give medicine or whether you give an IV
Anderson, 1995 WL 109128, at *1.
144. Anderson, 614 N.E.2d at 843.
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tion - electrically shocking the heart with paddles. 45 Winter thanked the
nurse for saving his life when he regained consciousness. 46 Dr. Russo
ordered lidocame to be readministered to treat Winter and to prevent further
attacks. 47 Another episode two hours later ended spontaneously due to the
lidocaine. 4 On May 29, Dr. Russo discontinued the lidocame and the
heart monitor.1 49 The following day, Winter had a stroke which left him
paralyzed on the right side.50 On June 16, 1988, SFSG transferred Winter
to a rehabilitation hospital. At that time, Winter "was unable to walk, was
incontinent of urine, had difficulty speaking, and needed assistance in
bathing and dressing."'5 After a four-week stay in a rehabilitation hospital,
Winter returned to his home where, for a two-month period, a nurse cared
for him during the day and one of his daughters cared for him m the
evening.1 52 He later moved into one of his daughter's homes so that she
could care for him.5 On April 19, 1989, he moved into a nursing home
where he enjoyed numerous visits and outings with hIs family before he
died on April 14,

1 9 9 0 .1

4

Winter's estate brought an action against SFSG alleging that the
nurse's resuscitation was a battery to Winter, that the nurse was negligent
by resuscitating Winter contrary to Dr. Russo's orders, and that SFSG was
liable for Winter's wrongful living. 55 The56trial court granted SFSG's
motion for summary judgment on all counts.
The appellate court reversed on the battery claim, finding that there
were disputed questions of fact regarding whether Winter's instructions had
specifically precluded defibrillation.11 The court found that if the instructions did preclude defibrillation then SFSG's treatment constituted a battery 151 Moreover, if SFSG committed a battery, then there was a genuine
145. Id.
146. Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 226.
147 Id.
148. Id.

149. Id.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Anderson, 1995 WL 109128, at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 276.
Anderson, 614 N.E.2d at 843.
Id.

157

Id. at 844.

158. Id.
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issue of material fact regarding whether Winter's alleged damages after the

defibrillation - including a paralyzing stroke as well as pain, suffering,
emotional distress and disability, and medical expenses - were proxinately
caused by the original wrongful act.159
The appellate court, however, affirmed the trial court's summary judg-

ment on the wrongful living claim."6 Winter's estate had argued that when
SFSG prolonged his life by the defibrillation, his life "was for hun, not
worth living. "' 16 The court relied on Leach and two cases allowing wrongful pregnancy actions to support the wrongful living claim.62 The appellate
court found these cases unpersuasive and stated that in the wrongful

pregnancy cases the Ohio Supreme Court had "noted with disapproval the
wrongful life cause of action for children of negligently sterilized mothers,
which measures 'damages on the relative merits of being versus nonbeing.""'
The Ouo Supreme Court had also "referred to the joy of life
as an 'intangible benefit' that [could] not be valued monetarily "14 The
Anderson court decided that: "Damages

are not those things that add

to life, but those that subtract from it."'"
The court also rejected the estate's analogy to Leach. Noting that

although Leach held that the plaintiff had a cause of action for the nonconsensual medical treatment, the court stated that "[t]here was no need
to coin a cause of action for the wrongful act. The court held that a 'physi159. Id. at 845.
160. Id. at 847
161. Id.
162. Id. at 846; see Johnson v. University, 540 N.E.2d 1370, 1378 (Ohio 1989); Bowman
v Davis, 356 N.E.2d 496, 499 (Ohio 1976). A wrongful pregnancy claim (also known as
wrongful conception) is brought by parents alleging negligent performance of a sterilization
procedure or abortion and the subsequent birth of a child. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1612
(6th ed. 1990). In Bowman and Johnson, doctors had attempted to sterilize women and
eliminate future pregnancies. Johnson, 540 N.E.2d at 1370-71; Bowman, 356 N.E.2d at 497.
In both cases, the physicians negligently performed the operations, and the patients became
pregnant. Anderson, 614 N.E.2d at 846.
163. Anderson, 614 N.E.2d at 845 (quoting Bowman, 356 N.E.2d at 499). A wrongful
life claim is a "type of medical malpractice claim brought on behalf of a child born with birth
defects, alleging the child would not have been born but for negligent advice to, or treatment
of the parents." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1613 (6th ed. 1990). For a more complete
discussion of how wrongful life claims relate to ones for wrongful pregnancy and the damages
allowable therein, see infra notes 234-40 and accompanying text.
164. Anderson, 614 N.E.2d at 845 (quoting Johnson, 540 N.E.2d at 1375). The Ohio
Court of Appeals ultimately issued a definitive rejection of wrongful life claims in Flanagan
v. Williams, 623 N.E.2d 185, 191 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
165. Anderson, 614 N.E.2d at 846. The court listed as examples of compensable damages
wrongful death, unlawful shortening of a person's life, general physical injuries, loss of use
of a limb, and emotional harm caused by another's negligence. Id.
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cian who treats a patient without consent commits a battery ' Under Leach,

therefore, there is no wrongful-living cause of action."16 The Anderson
court concluded: "fThe estate's] attempt to create a wrongful-living cause
of actionfails because life is not a compensable harm."167 On appeal after
remand, the appellate court clarified what it meant m holding that wrongful
living is not a compensable harm: "By that we mean that he cannot recover
general damages just for finding himself still alive after unwanted resuscitative measures. "168
The Ohio Supreme Court agreed with tis conclusion. 169 It stated: "In
its simplest form, the question [presented by a wrongful living claim]
becomes: Is 'continued living' a compensable mjury9" 70 The court concluded that it is not; even if the plaintiff could show a breach of a duty and
the resulting prolongation of life."'
The court's decision focused on the difficulty of determining damages

for the harm of prolongation of life, stating that "[tlhere is perhaps no issue
that better demonstrates the outer bounds of liability m the American civil
justice system than this issue."" It noted that it had previously recognized
166. Id. (citations omitted).
167 Id. (emphasis added).
168. Anderson, 1995 WL 109128, at *3. The court made clear, however, that this did
not mean that Winter was precluded from all damages. The court noted that it had previously
held that Winter's estate stated a claim for battery and negligence:
To be more precise, Edward Winter gave express directives for his medical care
which were ignored, either negligently or intentionally. His right to refuse treatment
was expressly violated. [Winter's estate's] claim for damages must be examined m
light of the increasingly important public policy issues involved here, namely the
right to refuse treatment, either by speaking for oneself or through someone else, if
unable to do so. We thus hold that the issue in this case is what compensable damages arise from the violation of a competent adult patient's right to refuse treatment.
Id. The court then specified the allowable damages:
If the jury determines that adverse consequences to Winter's health occurred in a
natural and continuous sequence following the unwanted resuscitative effort, then
Winter's estate may recover all damages related thereto, including all of Winter's
medical expenses after May 28, 1988, until his death, the costs of the nursing home,
and any extraordinary expenses related to Winter's care; and his pain, suffering and
emotional distress related to having a stroke. On the other hand, if the jury concludes that there is no causal relationship between the unwanted resuscitative efforts
and Winter's adverse health consequences, there will be no recoverable damages for
Winter's estate.
Id. at *5.
169. Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 228-29
170. Id. at 227
171. Id. at 228-29.
172. Id. at 228.
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the "'impossibility of a jury placing a price' on the benefit of life"" and
concluded: "There are some mistakes, indeed even breaches of duty or techmcal assaults, that people make in this life that affect the lives of others for
winch there simply should be no monetary compensation." 174
b. McGuinness v Barnes
A per cunam appellate decision, McGuinness v Barnes,175 also rejected

a wrongful living claim, although in dicta it left open the possibility of future
recognition of the action." Richard McGuinmess is a former Newark, New
Jersey detective who suffered brain damage during surgery to remove a brain
173. Id. (citation omitted).
174. Id. (citing Heiner v. Moretuzzo, 652 N.E.2d 664, 670 (Ohio 1995) (Heweraffirmed
"that 'not every wrong is deserving of a legal remedy.'")). The court did allow Winter's
estate to proceed with the negligence and battery claims. Id. at 228-29. However, it reversed
the appellate court's decision to allow recovery for all foreseeable consequences of the
treatment, including pain, suffering, and emotional distress beyond that which Winter would
have suffered had he not been resuscitated. Id. It stated that the appellate court's "theory of
recovery seems to be identical to the theory of recovery underlying a claim of 'wrongful
living.' Both the law of the case and our holding here make this theory untenable, and
damages, if any, must be based strictly on the theory of negligence or battery." Id. at 228.
The court then noted, however, that a plaintiff is entitled to only nominal damages when a
battery was physically harmless. Id. at 229 (citing Lacey v Laird, 139 N.E.2d 25, 25 (Ohio
1956)). The court found that Winter suffered no harm due to defibrillation, "i.e., no tissue
burns or broken bones." Id. Winter's estate conceded that it was not seeking nominal
damages. Id. Accordingly, the court concluded that there was no issue for the trial court to
decide upon remand and entered judgment for SFSG. Id.
A concurring opinion suggested that the type of case before the court "should be
denominated 'furthering life' rather than 'wrongful living.'" Id. at 229 (Douglas, J., concumng). That opimon then asked:
Applying the positive connotation to an act which continues life, where death
would have occurred without intervention, what damage could possibly ensue?
Assuming, for purposes of argument only, that the action of the hospital
through its staff was negligence, and assuming further that "damages" should be
assessed as a result of the negligence, how could they be computed? Can the preservation of life (furthering life) even be amenable to the "damages" concept. I think not!
Id. (Douglas, J.,concurring). Three justices dissented and stated:
Contrary to the assertion of the majority opinion, the plaintiff was not seeking to
recover because Winter's life was prolonged. He was seeking to recover because the
hospital staff failed to follow the instructions Winter had given them. He claimed that
this negligence increased the likelihood that Winter would suffer a stroke. Not only
did Winter suffer a stroke, he was incapacitated from that day until the day of his
death.
Id. at 230 (Pfeifer, J.,dissenting).
175. No. A-3457-94T5, slip op. (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 6, 1996).
176. McGuinness v. Barnes, No. A-3457-94T5, slip op. at 8-9 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. Aug. 6, 1996).
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tumor.'" In early 1986, McGuinness noticed that he began stubbing his toe
and that once when his brother asked him a question he could not answer
it.17 8 McGuinness, then fifty-seven years old, went to see a New Jersey neurologist in July 1986; the neurologist diagnosed McGuinness with a probable
brain tumor. 179 McGuinness was referred to a doctor practicing at Mt. Sinai
Medical Center in New York City 11 In August 1986, McGuinness underwent
an angiogram and a frontal parietal cramotomy with a total removal of a
tumor.' After the surgery, McGuinness was unable to move his legs, and his
right arm was weakened." Since then, his condition has unproved slightly,
but he is unable to care for himself and now lives m a nursing home. 11
After his injury, McGuinness retained attorney Timothy Barnes to file
a lawsuit on his behalf. " Barnes failed to do so, and McGuinness brought
a legal malpractice action against Barnes."s McGuinness claimed that Barnes
wrongly advised him that he could not file a lawsuit on McGuinness's behalf
in the state in which the operation took place (New York). 16 McGuinness
also accused Barnes of abandoning McGuinness's interests shortly before the
statute of limitations on filing a medical malpractice stut expired. "s
Among the underlying medical malpractice claims included m the legal
malpractice suit against Barnes, McGuinness alleged that if he had been
informed of the risks of the procedure he underwent to remove the tumor,
he would have rejected the surgery '1 McGuinness claimed that his doctor
told him the operation was routine and did not advise him of the possible
serious repercussions. 8 9 McGuinness later learned that he would have died
within six months to a year without the surgery and asserted that he would
have preferred this early death to his current disabled condition. o
177 Id. at 3.
178. Plaintiff-Appellant Richard McGuinness' Brief m Support of His Appeal at 5-6,
McGumness (No. A-3457-94T5).
179. McGuinness (No. A-3457-94T5), slip op. at 2.
180. Id. at 3.

181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Plaintiff-Appellant Richard McGuinness' Brief at 7, McGunness (No. A-3457-94T5).
185. McGunness (No. A-3457-94T5), slip op. at 3.
186. Plaintiff-Appellant Richard McGumness' Brief at 7-8, McGuinness (No. A-3457-

94T5).
187
188.
189.
190.

Id.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 16.

186
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In his response to Barnes's motion to dismiss, McGuinness stated that
"just because [he] is alive today and conventional medical opuuon suggests
that he would have died without the surgery does not necessarily mean that
he benefitted by the operation.""' McGumness argued that:
His first and only love of his life was being a police officer. When he
suffered a heart attack, had cataract surgery, blood disorders and other
illnesses, he stayed on the job. While others would have retired, gone
out on disability long before, Richard McGuinness remained as a police
officer dedicated to law enforcement. He changed job duties but still
remained on the job. He wanted to continue as a police officer until he
died. Both the United States Constitution and the New Jersey Constitution as well as the common law guarantee his right to self-determination
even if he had only six months or a year to live. RichardMcGuinness
had the right to live the remainder of his life protecting the rights of
others instead of requiring around the clock care in a life of partial
paralysis.19'
McGuinness further argued that to hold that he had
no legally cognizable claim for damages, would m effect, license the
medical profession
to disregard the rights of those who have lifethreatening illnesses. To rule in favor of the Defendants would send a
message to the medical community that it may disregard the rights of
those who are terminally ill because they would die eventually These
rights are basic to all of us. 1"
However, in an unpublished oral ruling, the trial court rejected this
argument.194 In a decision based mainly on traditional informed consent
principles, the judge found that the doctors had no duty to inform McGuinness of the option of nontreatment because a reasonable person would

191. Brief in Opposition to Motion In Liine to Bar Doctor Schneck's Report and/or
Dismiss Plaintiff's Case at 19, McGumness v. Barnes (No. UNN-L-171-93) (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div.). Substantially identical language appears in McGuinness's appellate brief.
Plaintiff-Appellant Richard McGuinness' Brief at 15, McGuinness (No. A-3457-94T5).
192. Brief in Opposition to Motion In Limine to Bar Doctor Schneck's Report and/or

Dismiss Plaintiff's Case at 20, McGuinness (No. UNN-L-171-93). Substantially identical
language appears in McGumness's appellate brief. Plaintiff-Appellant Richard McGumness'
Brief at 16, McGuinness (No. A-3457-94T5).
193. Brief m Opposition to Motion In Liine to Bar Doctor Schneck's Report and/or

Dismiss Plaintiff's Case at 20-21, McGumness (No. UNN-L-171-93). Substantially identical
language appears in McGuinness's appellate brief. Plaintiff-Appellant Richard McGumness'
Brief at 16, McGuinness (No. A-3457-94T5).
194. Transcript of Proceedings at 63, McGuinness (No. L-1710-93).
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have gone ahead with the surgery 195 The court also noted that the record
was unclear whether McGuinness's doctor knew before the surgery that
nontreatment would result in certain death and whether McGuinness would
have withheld consent if he knew all the risks. 9 It concluded: "Given that
[McGuinness] had successfully undergone treatment which saved his life,
this Court finds that
[McGuinness]
has no cause of action for
wrongful life." 1"
The appellate court also based its decision on informed consent prmciples. 198 It noted that McGuinness's own expert testified that a reasonable
and prudent patient given all the appropriate information would have chosen
surgery instead of death."9 Thus, McGuinness's case failed under the
causation requirement of the informed consent doctrine, which requires a
showing that "the prudent person m the patient's position would have
decided differently if adequately informed."I
The court decided that McGuinness's failure to show causation also
barred his wrongful living claim."3 In doing so, however, it suggested in
dicta that such a claim could constitute a viable cause of action in the
proper circumstances:
We recognize
that a competent person has the right to refuse
medical treatment even at the risk of death. Arguably, if any of the
physicians involved in the case intentionally or willflly deprived [McGiunness] of that right of self-determination, that might give rise to an
independent cause of action. Not so in this case. If [McGuinness] was

195. Id. The court analogized to Iafelice v. Zafaru, id. at 62, m which the court
concluded that physicians were not liable under an informed consent theory when they
performed an operation that saved an infant's life, but failed to inform her parents that she
would likely require permanent institutional care. Iafelice v Zafaru, 534 A.2d 417, 418
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div 1987). The Iafelice court stated:
The mistaken premise of this appeal is that allowing the child to die untreated
was a legally viable alternative.
[W]e find no support for the belief that a
newborn child may be put to death through benign neglect on the mere expectation that she will, in some unquantified way, be a defective person.

Id.
196. Transcript of Proceedings at 63, McGunness (No. L-1710-93).
197 Id. The parties and the court erroneously referred to McGuinness's action as one
for "wrongful life," but it is clear from the facts that the actual cause of action was for
wrongful living.
198. McGuinness, slip op. at 8-9.
199. Id. at 6.
200. Id. at 7 (quoting Largey v Rothman, 540 A.2d 504, 510 (N.J. 1988)).
201. Id.at 9.
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deprived of his right to make a meaningful choice as to whether he
wished to live or die, that was because he was deprived o[f] the opportunity to give informed consent to the surgical procedure or procedures.
We have already decided that there is no basis for [a] medical malpractice action based on the lack of informed consent.202
c. Benoy v Simons and
Bartling v Glendale Adventist Medical Center
Other appellate courts, although not directly faced with a wrongful
living cause of action, have also been reluctant to allow damages for
commencing or continuing life-sustaining treatment. For example, in Benoy
v Simons"3 the court upheld the dismissal of a claim for "wrongful prolongation of life."'
Dustin Reed Benoy was born on March 11, 1985 at
Kadlec Medical Center (Kadlec) in Richland, Washington.' Dustin was
born prematurely, weighing less than two kilograms and suffering from
severe respiratory distress.' Kadlec placed Dustin in intensive care, and
he subsequently developed a pneumothorax and intracramal hemorrhage
with an mtracerebral hemorrhage, which required surgical intervention.'
During Dustin's hospitalization at Kadlec, his mother, father, and grandparents had frequent discussions with the hospital staff and doctors concerning the legal, medical, and financial issues surrounding Dustin's care."°
Neither his mother nor his grandparents were willing to permit the
appointment of a guardian, and his grandparents refused to be appointed.'
Dustin remained on a ventilator while hospitalized at Kadlec21° and was
later transferred to a hospital in Seattle. On April 27, 1985, Dustin was
removed from the ventilator, and he died.211
After his death, Dustin's mother and grandparents brought an action
against a physician and Kadlec and requested damages for, among other
things, wrongful prolongation of life. The plaintiffs argued that the
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. at 8-9 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
831 P.2d 167 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
Benoy v Simons, 831 P.2d 167, 169 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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rationale of Harbeson v Parke-Davis, Inc.,212 which allowed "a wrongful
[handicapped] child should by analogy
birth action by the parents of a
allow a wrongful prolongation of life action as well. "213 The court dis-

agreed. It found the analogy to Harbeson "unsound."214 The court stated
that Harbeson was "based on the recognition that parents have a right to
prevent the birth of a handicapped child and health care providers have a
duty to the parents correlative to that right."215 Thus, wrongful birth
actions were based on a doctor's breach of duty to the parents of a handicapped child as his patients. Tius was inapplicable to the case before the
court because Dustin was the patient. 216
In Bartlingv Glendale Adventist Medical Center,217 the court recognized that a patient had a right to refuse treatment, but found that this right
was not sufficiently established at the time to support a damages action for
its violation. 1 William Battling entered Glendale Adventist on April 8,
1984 for treatment of severe chromc depression. 219 He was also suffering
from pulmonary emphysema, atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease, coronary arteriosclerosis, an abdominal aneurysm, and lung cancer.2'2 On April
14, 1984, Bartling's left lung collapsed during a needle biopsy "2 After
attempts to re-inflate his lung failed, a mechanical ventilator was attached
by way of a tracheotomy I
On May 30, 1984, Battling signed a living will stating that he did not
want to be kept alive by "artificial means or heroic measures. "' Bartling
also executed a "Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care," appointing
his wife as attorney-m-fact. Additionally, he, his wife, and daughter
executed documents that released Glendale Adventist and its physicians
from any claim of civil liability should they honor his wishes. 2 4
212. 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983).
213. Benoy, 831 P.2d at 170.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217 229 Cal. Rptr. 360 (Ct. App. 1986).
218. Bartling v Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr. (Bartling 1, 229 Cal. Rptr. 360, 361
(Ct. App. 1986).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. ld.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. He also signed a declaration that stated, Inpart:
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Between June and August of 1984, doctors attempted to wean Bartling
from Ins ventilator. They resuscitated him each time because his "breathing
and/or heart action failed during the weaning process."I They also tried
to transfer hun to another hospital, but no other facility was willing to take
him. Bartling died while still at Glendale Adventist on November 6,
1984.6 He remained on the ventilator until his death and had, at one time,
been restrained by cloth cuffs around Ins wrists to prevent him from
removing the tubes.27
A month and a half after Bartling's death, the California Court of
Appeals held that a competent nonterminally ill adult patient has a constitutionally based right to reject or terminate medical treatment.' Shortly
after this decision, Bartling's family filed an amended complaint alleging
"battery, violation of constitutional and federal civil rights, breach of
fiduciary duty, and intentional infliction of emotional distress and conspiracy "I

The trial court dismissed tis complaint, and the court of appeals
affirmed 330 The court of appeals stated that:
It cannot be said that a common or comprehensive legal standard was in
place to guide the medical community at the time of Bartling's hospitalization - one which clearly should have compelled Glendale Adventist to
While I have no wish to die, I find intolerable the living condition forced upon me
by my deteriorating lungs, heart and blood vessel systems and find intolerable my
being continuously connected to this ventilator, which sustains my every breath and
my life for the past 6 and one-half (6 ) weeks. Therefore, I wish this Court to
recognize, honor and protect my constitutional right to liberty, privacy, self-dignity
and the control of my own body I wish this Court to order that the sustaining of
my respiration by this mechanical device violates my constitutional right, is
contrary to my every wish, and constitutes a battery upon my person.
Id. Bartling's declaration continued:
request
which I have frequently made to my wife
I fully understand that [this]
and to my doctors, will very likely cause respiratory failure and ultimately lead to
my death.. I am willing to accept that risk rather than to continue the burden of
this artificial existence which I find unbearable, degrading and dehumanizing. I
also suffer a great deal of pam and discomfort because of being confined to bed,
being on this ventilator, and from the other problems which are occurring.
Id. at 362.
225. Id. at 361.
226. Id. at 362.
227 Id.
228. Bartling v Superior Court (Bartling1), 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Ct. App. 1984).
229. Bartling v Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr. (BartlingR1), 229 Cal. Rptr. at 361.
230. Id. at 362.
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"pull the plug" on Mr. Bartling's ventilator.
The determination of the
call. It was only
a
judgment
law
was
under
extant
to
die
patient's right
after Barding I that California's physicians had legal precedent for freely
acting according to a competent adult patient's instructions to terminate
life-support systems without fear of civil liability and without advance court
approval.
[the hospital's] refusal to
While we found in Bartling I that
withdraw treatment intruded upon Mr. Bartling's right to privacy, we
cannot agree that the Bartlings' rights were so well-defined at the time of
Mr. Bartling's hospitalization that Glendale Adventist deliberately acted
with "conscious disregard" of their patient's constitutional rights. 31
231. Id. at 363 (citations omitted). The court dismissed the plaintiffs' emotional distress
claim and other claims for the same reason. Id. at 364-65.
Other finilies asserting emotional distress clais caused by witnessing the prolongation of a loved one's life have been similarly unsuccessful. For example, m Strachan v.
John F Kennedy Memortal Hospital, the appellate court reversed a $140,000 judgment in
favor of the parents of a suicide victim m an action alleging that a hospital had breached a
duty to provide consent forms for the pronouncement of death or the disconnection of a
respirator, or to have a procedure for turning off a respirator. Strachan v. John F Kennedy
Mem'l Hosp., 507 A.2d 718, 723-27 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div 1986).
Jeffrey Strachan arrived at the defendant hospital at approximately 5:00 P.M. on
Friday, April 25, 1980, after shooting himself m the head with a .38 caliber bullet. Id. at
720. The emergency room physician intubated Strachan and placed him on a respirator at
5:25 P.M. Id. He was declared brain dead later that night, and the following morning,
Saturday, April 26, 1980, his parents requested that he be removed from the respirator. Id.
The hospital refused, at first stating that a respirator could not be disconnected without a
court order. Id. The court order later became unnecessary, however, when a physician
agreed to remove Strachan from life-support systems and sign a death certificate if the
parents signed a release. Id. at 722. The release was signed on Monday, April 28, 1980.
Id. At that time, Strachan had no spontaneous respiration and was pronounced dead. Id.
Strachan's parents brought suit against the hospital alleging, among other things,
negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id. They were successful in the trial court, but
the appellate court reversed. Id. at 723. The court found that the "principles distilled from
existing law persuade us to conclude that the hospital had no duty to provide consent forms
or to have a procedure for turning off the respirator." Id. at 726. "Additionally, we discern
no defined public policy which imposes a duty on the hospital or its administrator to have
procedures and consent forms available for the withdrawal of life-support systems." Id. at
727; see also Westhart v Mule, 261 Cal. Rptr. 640, 640-42 (Ct. App. 1989) (concluding
that widow did not state cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress arising
from doctor's insertion of feeding tube into her husband, contrary to her wishes that no
heroic measures be taken to prolong his life, when there was no evidence that she later made
any efforts to have tube removed); Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr. (Bartling L),
229 Cal. Rptr. 360, 365 (Ct. App. 1986) (finding no cause of action for "outrage" or
intentional infliction of emotional distress when medical professionals "acted in reliance on
what they believed to be prevailing community medical and legal standards and did not use
their superior position to intentionally harass or intimidate the Bartlings"); Benoy v Simons,
831 P.2d 167, 169 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (same).
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The court also rejected an emotional distress claim m McVey v. Englewood Hospital
Association. In McVey, the court held that a hospital and physicians could not be held liable
for failing to comply with a comatose patient's undocumented oral request, as expressed by
family members, to terminate life support. McVey v Englewood Hosp. Ass'n, 524 A.2d
450, 452 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987). The estate and surviving daughters of Elizabeth
Palermo, sought damages for substantial medical costs and emotional suffering alleged to
have arisen from the failure to honor Palermo's wishes, as communicated by her daughters,
to be removed from life support. Id.
Palermo had been admitted to the hospital on March 17, 1985, "[i]n a deep coma and
suffering from respiratory failure," and was connected to a respirator. Id. at 451. A
physician told Palermo's daughters that same mght "that her brain stem activity was minimal
and that death would likely ensue" if the respirator were removed. Id. Palermo's daughters
asked that the respirator be terminated, stating that their mother had said she did not wish
to be artificially maintained m such a situation. Id. The hospital and doctors refused, however, until Palermo's daughters followed New Jersey procedure to become her guardians,
and then authorized discontinuation of treatment on April 22, 1985. Id. at 451-52. Palermo
died four days later. Id. at 452.
The daughters brought suit seeking damages for the defendants' failure to honor their
mother's wishes as communicated by them in March. Id. The trial court granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment, and the appellate court affirmed. Id. at 451.
The court held that hospitals and medical professionals do not have the duty or the expertise
to explore the extent of conflicting interests, views, and purposes when an incompetent
patient's relatives ask that life sustaining efforts be discontinued because of the patient's
orally expressed wishes. Id. at 452.
The court distinguished cases holding that physicians are free from civil or crimmal
liability when they acquiesce to an immediate family member's expression of an incompetent
patient's presumed or actual wish regarding the removal of life support. Id. (citing Barber
v Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Ct. App. 1983); John F Kennedy Mem'l Hosp. v
Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984)). The court noted:
Barberand Bludworth hold that physicians are free from civil or criminal liability
[when acquiescing to family wishes for the removal of life support]. It
is a very different thing, however, to assert that failure to comply with such
undocumented requests, and absent the appointment of a guardian, constitutes an
actionable breach of a duty owed to the patient and family That time has not
come in New Jersey
Id.
One commentator reviewing these decisions suggested that they reflected courts'
hesitancy to question physicians' medical judgment: "The judiciary's reaction to those few
cases in which patients or their families have sued for damages for nonconsensual [lifesustaining] treatment represents another instance of the legal system's uncritical endorsement
of the medical profession's activist approach." Nancy K. Rhoden, Litigating Life and
Death, 102 HARV L. REV 375, 430 (1988).
One area in which plaintiffs advocating the right to die have achieved monetary
success is the recovery of attorneys fees. See Gray v Romeo, 709 F Supp. 325, 327
(D.R.I. 1989) (awarding attorneys fees to patient who successfully sought declaration under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 that refusal to withdraw feeding tube violated her constitutional rights);
Bouvia v. County of Los Angeles, 241 Cal. Rptr. 239, 243-47 (Ct. App. 1987) (awarding
attorneys fees to patient who succeeded in obtaining court order allowing removal of feeding
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B. Wrongful Life: A Disabled Child's Assertion That
He Should Never Have Been Born
Rejection of the wrongful living cause of action in Anderson and
McGuinness and the hesitancy to award damages for life as opposed to
death in Benoy and Bartling is consistent with the vast majority of case law
on wrongful life claims. In a wrongful life claim:
The child does not allege that the physician's negligence caused the
child's deformity Rather, the claim is that the physician's negligence his failure to adequately inform the parents of the risk [that the child
would be born with a disability] - has caused the birth of the deformed
child. The child argues that but for the inadequate advice, it would not
have been born to experience the pain and suffering attributable to the
deformity

2

tube under California's "private attorney general" statute but denying attorneys fees under
42 U.S.C. § 1988 because there was "no evidence of a governmental policy or custom m
connection with decision by county hospital physicians and other personnel to withdraw her
from morphine"). But see Foster v. Tourtellotte, 704 F.2d 1109, 1112 (9th Cir. 1983)
(finding that Veterans Administration patient was not entitled to attorneys fees under Equal
Access to Justice Act even though he prevailed on claim that failure to remove him from
respirator violated his right to privacy; government's position that it needed court guidance
in resolving issue m absence of any precedent was "substantially justified").
232. Harbeson v Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 494 (Wash. 1983) (en banc)
(quoting Thomas Keasler Foutz, Comment, "Wrongfu Le
fe" The Right Not to Be Born, 54
TUL. L. REv 480, 485 (1980)); see also Berman v Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 11 (N.J. 1979)
("'[T]he infant plaintiff [asserts]
not that [she] should not have been born without
defects but [rather] that [she] should not have born at all
In essence, Sharon claims
that her very life is 'wrongful.'").
A wrongful life claim is closely related to a wrongful birth action, which includes the
same allegations, but is brought by the parents of the handicapped child. BLACK's LAW
DICTIONARY 1612 (6th ed. 1990). Wrongful life and wrongful birth actions differ from
wrongful conception or pregnancy cases in which the claim is brought by parents "for
damages arising from the negligent performance of a sterilization procedure or abortion, and
the subsequent birth of a child." Id., see also Cowe v Forum Group, Inc., 575 N.E.2d
630, 633 (Ind. 1991) (citations omitted). The Cowe court stated:
An action for wrongful conception or pregnancy refers to a claim for damages
sustained by the parents of an unexpected child allegmg that the conception of the
child resulted from negligent sterilization procedures or a defective contraceptive
product. The phrase 'wrongful birth' applies to claims brought by the parents
of a child born with birth defects alleging that due to negligent medical advice
or testing they were precluded from an informed decision about whether to conceive a potentially handicapped child or, in the event of a pregnancy, to terminate it. When such action seeks damages on behalf of the child rather than the
parents, the phrase 'wrongful life' instead of 'wrongful birth' is employed.
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With few exceptions, courts faced with the issue have refused to recognize
wrongful life claims.Y3 In addition, a number of states have enacted
Several writers have drawn an analogy between wrongful life and wrongful living
actions. See, e.g., Allen J. Belsky, Injury As a Matter of Law: Is This the Answer to the
Wrongful Life Dilemma?, 22 U. BALT. L. REv 185, 223-34 (1993); Dooling, supranote
108, at 916-17 Oddi, however, stated that a wrongful living cause of action should be
distinguished from wrongful life claims. See Oddi, supra note 18, at 641 n.75. Oddi states
that "[tihe difficulty with the 'wrongful life' cases is the damages element, because a
comparison must be made between nonlife and life in an inpaired condition." Id. As
discussed below, see infra notes 344-47 and accompanying text, this same problem arises
in wrongful living cases.
Knapp and Hamilton also attempted to distinguish wrongful living and wrongful life
cases:
In contrast to the "wrongful life" concept, the "wrongful living" plaintiff does not
assert a right to make a retrospective decision about whether to be born, that is,
to speculate about what decision the plaintiff would have made had the future
been known to the plamtiff prior to conception or in utero. The "wrongful
living" plaintiff weighs the effects of his medical therapy and his prognosis with
and without the therapy, against the desirability of remaining alive.
Knapp & Hamilton, supra note 18, at 258 (citations omitted). I suggest below, see infra
notes 34045 and accompanying text, that this is a distinction without a difference and that
it ignores the fundamental similarity between the two causes of action: the plaintiffs in both
argue.that they would be better off dead and that they are entitled to damages due to the
quality of their life.
233. The cases in which state courts have denied wrongful life claims include: Elliott
v Brown, 361 So. 2d 546, 548 (Ala. 1978); Walker v Mart, 790 P.2d 735, 741 (Ariz.
1990); Lminger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1210 (Colo. 1988); Garrison v Medical Ctr.
of Del. Inc., 581 A.2d 288, 289 (Del. 1989); Kush v Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415, 423 (Fla.
1992); Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315, 322 (Idaho 1984); Sienuemec v Lutheran Gen. Hosp.,
512 N.E.2d 691, 701 (11. 1987); Cowe v Forum Group, Inc., 575 N.E.2d 630, 635 (End.
1991); Bruggeman v Schunke, 718 P.2d 635, 642 (Kan. 1986); Pitre v Opelousas Gen.
Hosp., 517 So. 2d 1019, 1025 (La. Ct. App. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds, 530 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1988); Viccaro v Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d 8, 12 (Mass.
1990); Strohmaier v. Associates in Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C., 332 N.W.2d 432, 434
(Mich. Ct. App. 1982); Wilson v Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741, 743 (Mo. 1988); Greco v
United States, 893 P.2d 345, 348 (Nev 1995); Smith v Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 355 (N.H.
1986); Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. 1978); Azzolino v Dingfelder, 337
S.E.2d 528, 532 (N.C. 1985); Flanagan v Williams, 623 N.E.2d 185, 191 (Ohio Ct. App.
1993); Ellis v Sherman, 515 A.2d 1327, 1329-30 (Pa. 1986); Nelson v Krusen, 678
S.W.2d 918, 925 (Tex. 1984); James G. v Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 881 (W Va. 1985);
Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372, 376 (Wis. 1975); Beardsley v Wierdsma,
650 P.2d 288, 289 (Wyo. 1982).
Three jurisdictions have recognized the wrongful life cause of action. See Turpm v
Sortim, 643 P.2d 954, 966 (Cal. 1982); Procanik v Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 762 (N.J. 1984);
Harbeson v Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 495 (Wash. 1983).
In contrast, many courts have recognized the wrongful birth cause of action. See,
e.g., Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471, 476 (7th Cir. 1981); Gallagher v. Duke Univ.,
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statutory bans on wrongful life, wrongful birth, or wrongful pregnancy
claims, or all three.'
638 F Supp. 979, 982 (M.D.N.C. 1986), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 852 F.2d 773 (4th
Cir. 1988); Phillips v. United States, 508 F Supp. 544, 551 (D.S.C. 1981); Andalon v
Superior Court, 208 Cal. Rptr. 899, 901 (Ct. App. 1984); Haymon v Wilkerson, 535 A.2d
880, 882 (D.C. 1987); Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022, 1026 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
Siemieniec v Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691, 706 (Il. 1987); Arche v. United
States, Dep't of Army, 798 P.2d 477, 480 (Kan. 1990); Pitre v Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 517
So. 2d 1019, 1025 (La. Ct. App. 1987); Thibeault v Larson, 666 A.2d 112, 115 (Me.
1995); Proffitt v Bartolo, 412 N.W.2d 232, 238 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); Smith v Cote,
513 A.2d 341, 348 (N.H. 1986); Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 762 (N.J. 1984); Becker
v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 813 (N.Y 1978); Speck v Finegold, 439 A.2d 110, 113-14
(Pa. 1981); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 850 (Tex. 1975); Naccash v Burger, 290
S.E.2d 825, 830 (Va. 1982); Harbeson v Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 488 (Wash.
1983); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 882 (W Va. 1985); Dumer v St. Michael's
Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372, 377 (Wis. 1975).
A majority of jurisdictions recognize wrongful pregnancy or conception claims. See
Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 723 (Ala. 1982); University of Ariz. Health Sciences
Ctr. v. Superior Court, 667 P.2d 1294, 1299 (Ariz. 1983) (en banc); Wilbur v Kerr, 628
S.W.2d 568, 571 (Ark. 1982); Turpm v. Sortmi, 643 P.2d 954, 957-58 (Cal. 1982) (en
banc); Ochs v. Borrelli, 445 A.2d 883, 884 (Conn. 1982); Fassoulas v Ramey, 450 So. 2d
822, 823 (Fla. 1984); Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v Graves, 314 S.E.2d 653, 654 (Ga.
1984); Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315, 317-18 (Idaho 1984); Byrd v Wesley Med. Ctr., 699
P.2d 459, 461 (Kan. 1985); Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861, 862 (Ky 1983); Jones v
Malinowski, 473 A.2d 429, 432 (Md. 1984); Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511, 516 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 170 (Minn. 1977); Miller
v Duhart, 637 S.W.2d 183, 188 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Kingsbury v Smith, 442 A.2d
1003, 1005 (N.H. 1982); Schroeder v Perkel, 432 A.2d 834, 838 (N.J. 1981); Lovelace
Med. Ctr. v. Mendez, 805 P.2d 603, 609 (N.M. 1991); Bowman v Davis, 356 N.E.2d
496, 499 (Ohio 1976); Speck v Finegold, 439 A.2d 110, 113 (Pa. 1981); Jacobs v
Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 848 ('rex. 1975); Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825, 830 (Va.
1982); McKeman v. Aasheim, 687 P.2d 850, 856 (Wash. 1984) (en banc); Dumer v St.
Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372, 377 (Wis. 1975); Beardsley v Wierdsma, 650 P.2d
288, 292 (Wyo. 1982).
234. See IDAHO CODE § 5-334 (1990) (barring both wrongful life and wrongful birth
clains); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-1-11 (West 1992) (barring wrongful life claims); MINN.
STAT. § 145.424(1)- 424(2) (1989) (barring wrongful life and wrongful birth claims); Mo.
REV STAT. § 188.130 (1996) (same); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-43 (1996) (barring
wrongful life clains); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305 (West Supp. 1997) (barrmg
wrongful life and wrongful birth clais); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 21-55-1, 21-55-2 (Michie
1987) (barring wrongful life, wrongful birth, and wrongful conception clans); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-11-24 (1996) (barrmg wrongful life and wrongful birth claims).
The wrongful life cause of action has been the subject of numerous law review articles
including several m the past few years. See generally, e.g, John F Hemandez, Pennatal
Transission of HIV. Causefor the Resurrection of Wrongful Life, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV
393 (1994); Anthony Jackson, Actionfor Wrongful Life, Wrongful Pregnancy, and Wrongful
Birth in the United States and England, 17 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 535 (1995);
Michael B. Laudor, In Defense of Wrongful Life: Bringing PoliticalTheory to the Defense
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Courts give two general reasons for not recognizmg wrongful life
claims. The first is "a general conceptual unwillingness to recognize any
cogmzable damages for a child born with a genetic impairment as opposed
to not being born at all. "I As one court noted:
Whether it is better never to have been born at all than to have been born
with even gross deficiencies is a mystery more properly to be left to the
philosophers and the theologians. Surely the law can assert no competence to resolve the issue, particularly m view of the very nearly uniform
high value which the law and manlnd has placed on human life, rather
than its absence.'
Accordingly, those courts have held that "life, even life with severe defects,
cannot be an injury in the legal sense.237
The second basis for rejecting wrongful life claims "is the impossibility
of calculating compensatory damages to restore a birth defective child to the
position he would have occupied were it not for the defendant's negligence. "28 As one judge explained:
When a jury considers the claim of a once-healthy plaintiff that a defendant's negligence harmed him - for example, by breaking his arm - the
jury's ability to say that the plaintiff has been "injured" is manifest, for
the value of a healthy existence over an impaired existence is within the
experience of imagination of most people. The value of non-existence its very nature - however, is not."3 9

of a Tort, 62 FORDHAM L. REV 1675 (1994); Phillip G. Peters, Jr., Rethinking Wrongful
Life: Bridging the Boundary Between Tort and Family Law, 67 TuL. L. REV 397 (1992);
Tara A. Barrett, Development, Hummel v Reiss: The New Jersey Supreme Court Takes a
Step Backward m Its Recognition of Wrongful Life, 46 RUTGERS L. REV 535 (1993); Julie
F Kowitz, Note, Not Your Garden Variety Tort Reform: Statutes Barring Claimsfor Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth Are Unconstitutional Under the Purpose Prong of Planned
Parenthood v Casey, 61 BROOK. L. REV 235 (1995).
235. Cowe v Forum Group, Inc., 575 N.E.2d 630, 634 (Ind. 1991); see also
Siemieniec v Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691, 697 (111. 1987).
236. Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. 1978), quoted m Greco v United
States, 893 P.2d 345, 348 (Nev 1995).
237 Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 532 (N.C. 1985), quoted in Cowe, 575
N.E.2d at 635; see also Flanagan v Williams, 623 N.E.2d 185, 191 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993)
("[We are not prepared to say that life, even with severe disabilities, constitutes an actionable injury ").
238. Cowe, 575 N.E.2d at 634; see also Siemnemec, 512 N.E.2d at 697
239. Speck v. Finegold, 408 A.2d 496, 512 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (Spaeth, J., concurring and dissenting), aff'd by an equally divided court, 439 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1981).
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involves 'a calculation of
Put another way- "The wrongful life action
damages dependent upon the relative benefits of an impaired life as opposed
at all.' This is a 'comparison the law is not equipped to
to no life
240
make.'
240. Cowe, 575 N.E.2d at 634 (quoting Siemernec, 512 N.E.2d at 697; Becker, 386
N.E.2d at 812). Even those few courts that have recognized the cause of action for wrongful life have been careful to hold that an injured child does not have a claim for general
damages, but may only recover special damages resulting from extraordinary expenses for
medical care or specialized teaching. For example, in Turpin v. Sortint, the court decided:
[With respect to the child's claim for pam and suffering or other general damages recovery should be denied because (1) it is simply impossible to determine
[child] has m fact suffered
in any rational or reasoned fashion whether the
an injury in being born impaired rather than not being born, and (2) even if it
were possible to overcome the first hurdle, it would be impossible to assess
general damages in any fair, non-speculative manner.
Turpm v. Sortim, 643 P.2d 954, 963 (Cal. 1982). Moreover, a "monetary award of general
- cannot in any meaningful
damages - as opposed to the claim for medical expenses
[child] for the loss of opportunity not to be born." Id. at 964.
sense compensate the
Similar reasoning is found in Procanikv. Cllo:
Sound reasons exist not to recognize a claim for general damages.
The crux of the problem is that there is no rational way to measure nonexistence or to compare non-existence with the pain and suffering of [the
child's]
existence. Whatever theoretical appeal one might find in recognizing a claim for pain and suffering is outweighed by the essentially irrational and
unpredictable nature of that claim. Although damages in a personal ijury action
need not be calculated with mathematical precision, they require at their base
some modicum of rationality.
[lit is simply too speculative to permit an infant plaintiff to recover for
emotional distress attendant on birth defects when that plaintiff clais he would
be better off if he had not been born. Such a claim would stir the passions of
jurors about the nature and value of life, the fear of non-existence, and about
abortion. That mix is more than the judicial system can digest. We believe that
the interests of fairness and justice are better served through more predictably
measured damages - the cost of extraordinary medical expenses necessitated by
the infant plaintiff's handicaps. Damages so measured are not subject to the
same wild swings as a claim for pain and suffering and will carry a sufficient
sting to deter future acts of medical malpractice.
Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 763 (N.J. 1984); see also Harbeson v Parke-Davis, Inc.,
656 P.2d 483, 496-97 (Wash. 1983) (en bane) (noting that general damages were "beyond
computation" in wrongful life action, but that extraordinary expenses for medical care and
special training were calculable and could thus be recovered).
Courts have reached similar decisions in wrongful birth cases, holding that while
ordinary child-rearing costs are not recoverable, parents may recover for extraordinary
medical and educational expenses attributable to a child's birth defect. See Flanagan, 623
N.E.2d at 188. See generally Melissa K. Smith-Groff, Note, Wrongful Conception: When
an Unplanned ChOild Has a Birth Defect, Who Should Pay the Cost?, 61 Mo. L. REv 135,
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IV Societal PrejudiceAgainst Disability and the Right to Die:
Better Off Dead than Disabled?
Despite the frequent statements in wrongful life cases that it is mipos-

sible to compare life with a disability to nonlife, one concern raised
regarding these cases - as well as the right-to-die cases and especially the

assisted suicide cases - is that they reflect a societal prejudice that devalues
the worth of disabled persons' lives."

Specifically, both courts and

commentators find that the recognition of each of these rights is based upon
a societal prejudice that life with a disability is not worth living. The
wrongful living cause of action reflects the same view, and it is vital for
courts addressing it to understand the roots of this prejudice and the danger

that recognition of this tort poses for persons with disabilities.
A. The View of Disability in Everyday Life
and in the Media: A Double StandardBetween the Value of Life
with a Disability and Without It

The view that life with a disability is not worth living can be seen in
everyday interactions among the disabled and the able-bodied, and in

artistic depictions of people with disabilities. 2

People with disabilities

140-43 & nn.47-67 (1996). At least two courts, however, have denied the recovery of even
extraordinary expenses m wrongful conception actions, holding that a doctor's negligent
performance of a sterilization procedure does not increase the probability that the child will
be born with a defect and is, therefore, too far removed to be considered the proximate
cause of a birth defect. See LaPomt v Shirley, 409 F Supp. 118, 121 (W.D. Tex. 1976)
(labeling action incorrectly as wrongful birth when child resulted from unsuccessful tubal
ligation, which is wrongful conception action); Williams v Van Biber, 886 S.W.2d 10, 1314 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). Maine has a statutory bar to wrongful birth and wrongful life
claims when a child is born healthy and limits damages under both claims to extraordinary
expenses when the child is born with a disability. See ME. REV STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931
(West 1990).
241. See generally Martha A. Field, Killing "The Handicapped"- Before and After
Birth, 16 HARV WOMEN'S L.J. 79 (1993); Carol J. Gill, Suicide Interventionfor People
with Disabilities:A Lesson in Iequality, 8 IssuEs L. & MED. 37 (1992); Paul K. Longmore,
Elizabeth Bouvta, Assisted Suicide and Social Prejudice, 3 ISSUES L. & MED. 141 (1987);
Paul Steven Miller, The Impact of Assisted Suicide on Persons with Disabilities- Is It a
Right Without Freedom?, 9 IsSUES L. & MED. 47 (1993); Lois Shepherd, ProtectingParents'
Freedom to Have Children with Genetic Differences, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV 761, Teresa
Harvey Paredes, Comment, The Killing Words? How the New Quality-of-Life Ethic Affects
People with Severe Disabilities,46 SMU L. REv 805 (1992).
242. Both Congress and the Supreme Court have recognized the existence of societal
prejudice against persons with disabilities. In the findings and purposes listed m the first
section of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Congress found that "historically, society has
tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improve-
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report that complete strangers come up to them and talk about suicide. 3
ments, such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a
serious and pervasive social problem." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (1994). Further, the Act
notes that "studies have documented that people with disabilities, as a group, occupy an
inferior status m our society, and are severely disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally " Id. § 12101(6). The Act also states:
[MIndividuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have been
faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful
unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness m our
society, based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals
and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual
ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society
Id. § 12101(7). Congress then stated that the purpose of the ADA was "to provide a clear
and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals
with disabilities" and "to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing
discrumnation against individuals with disabilities." Id. § 12101(2).
The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on an ADA case, but has recognized the
existence of prejudice and discrnmmation against persons with disabilities m several of its
rulings. For example, in Alexander v. Choate, the Court quoted sponsors of the ADA's
precursor, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which forbids federal funds
recipients from discriminating on the basis of disability Alexander v Choate, 469 U.S.
287, 296 (1985). The Court described the treatment of the handicapped as one of the
country's "shameful oversights" that caused the handicapped to live among society "shunted
aside, hidden, and ignored." Id. (quoting 117 CONG. REC. 45974 (1971) (statement of Rep.
Vanik describing origins of Section 504)). Similarly, Senator Humphrey asserted that "we
can no longer tolerate the invisibility of the handicapped m America." Id. (quoting 118
CONG. REC. 525-26 (1972)); see also Cleburne v Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 454 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that "through ignorance and prejudice, the
mentally retarded 'have been subjected to a history of unfair and often grotesque mistreatment'" (quoting Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. v Clebure, 726 F.2d 191, 197 (1984))).
For an extensive discussion on disability discrimnmation m American society and its
legal system, see generally WILIE V. BRYAN, IN SEARCH OF FREEDOM: How PERSONS WITH
DISABILmES HAVE BEEN DISENFRANCHISED FROM THE MAINSTREAM OF AMERICAN SOCIETY
(1996); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE, INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAW (1990); JOSEPH P SHAPIRO, No PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING
A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1993); RICHARD BRYANT TREANOR, WE OVERCAME: THE
STORY OF CIVIL RIGHTS FOR DISABLED PEOPLE (1993); and DISABLED PEOPLE AS SECOND
CLASS CITIZENS (Myron G. Eisenberg et al. eds., 1982). See also Marcia P Burgdorf &

Robert Burgdorf Jr., A History of Unequal Treatment: The Qualficationsof Handicapped
Personsas a "Suspect Class" Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REV
855 (1975); Jonathan C. Drinmer, Comment, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights:
Tracing the Evolution of FederalLegislationand Social Policyfor People with Disabilities,
40 UCLA L. REV 1341 (1993).
243. See JOHNHOCKENBERRY, MOVING VIoLATIONS: WAR ZONES, WHEELCHAIRS, AND
DECLARATIONS OF INDEPENDENCE 97 (1995). Hockenberry, a paraplegic broadcast
journalist, relates his encounter with a flight attendant watching him move from his wheelchair to a plane seat. She first complimented hun on his agility in making the move and
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Others simply imagme that life with a disability must be worse than without
it. For example, in Annie Hall, Woody Allen's character says:
I feel that life is divided up into the horrible and the miserable. Those
The horrible would be like, I don't know,
are the two categories.
terminal cases, you know, and blind people, cripples. I don't know how
they get through life. It's amazing to me. You know The miserable
is everyone else. So when you go through life, you should be thankful
that you're miserable. 2 "
then said: "I guess you are the first handicapped person I have ever seen up close. Have
you ever thought of killing yourself?" Id., SHAPIRO, supra note 242, at 38. Shapiro
discussed the experience of Paul Longmore, an historian who walks slowly due to childhood
polio. A stranger approached Longmore on the street and said: "If I were you, I'd kill
myself." Id. The connection of disability with suicide in the popular media was dramatically shown in the fall of 1995 when actor Christopher Reeve gave his first interview after
being paralyzed in a fUll from a horse. Though Reeve made only one passing remark in the
hour long interview about considering suicide briefly after his accident, that sound bite
appeared in almost every commercial advertising the interview, m the introductory piece
preceding it, in the lead of the Associated Press piece about it, and in several headlines
reporting it. See, e.g., Abraham Levy, Reeve Pondered Suicide After Paralyzing Fall,
AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Sept. 29, 1995, at B10; ParalyzedActor Reeve Says He Rejected
Suicide, Cm. Tam., Sept. 29, 1995, at 6. Perhaps most ominously, Geoffrey Fieger, the
attorney for "suicide doctor" Jack Kevorkian, cited Reeve as the kind of patient Kevorkian
would help commit suicide. John Larabee, Fieger, Examiner Square Off, DETROIT NEWS,
Nov 10, 1995, at D1.
Longmore's and Hockenberry's encounters and the reaction to Reeve's statement
reflect a society m which:
People with disabilities perceive their situations m much the same way as anyone
[it] may be difficult for the majority of able-bodied
else with a crisis would
people to accept. Adjusting to a physical disability is typically seen as the
hardest adjustment a person would ever be called on to make. People have been
known to say, "I would rather die than be blind, or paralyzed, or grossly disfigured." People do not usually say, "I would rather die than be poor, or lonely,
or depressed."
Nancy Weinberg, Another Perspective:Attitudes of People with Disabilities, in ATTITUDES
TOWARD PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 152 (Harold E. Yuker ed., 1988).
244. ANNIE HALL (United Artists 1977), quoted in Longmore, supra note 241, at 152.
Unfortunately, this viewpoint is not limited to a single movie. The author of an encyclopedic review of the depiction of persons with disabilities on television and in the movies noted:

A characteristic overused in disability portrayals is one termed as "devaluation."
People with disabilities are illustrated as hating themselves and their limitations.
They use poor language to further hammer home the point that they are, in their
own eyes, less than human. "Freak" is a word of popular usage among screen
characters. "Look at me!" is another term they employ, suggesting their appearance is inherently disgusting. It also serves the unspoken purpose of frightening
a non-disabled audience as they see a nervous non-disabled character fighting

back tears as they view the sight. This cancels out the possibility that disabled
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This statement reflects what Paul Steven Miller, now a commissioner

with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), says is "a
double standard between the value of the life of a person whose is able-

bodied and that of a person with a disability

"I

According to Miller:

people assimilate their own physicality and actually like themselves without the
aid of an omnscient non-disabled person to help them acquire understanding.
LAURIE. KLOBAS, DIsABILrrY DRAMA IN TELEvISION AND FILM at xiv (1988). For a more
academic look at the depiction of people with disabilities on film, see generally MARTIN F
NORDEN, THE CINEMA OF ISOLATION: A HISTORY OF PHYSICAL DISABILITY IN THE MOVIES
(1994).
The view that life with a disability is not worth living is most obviously reflected m
plays and movies dramatizing the assisted suicide issue. Brian Clark's play Whose Life Is
It Anyway? (1978) and the movie of the same name (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1982); the TV
movie An Act of Love (NBC television broadcast, Sept. 24, 1980), based on PAIGE MITCHELL, AN ACT OF LOVE: THE KILLING OF GEORGE ZYGMANIK (1976); and Steve Carter's
play Nevis Mountain Dew (1979) all tell the stories of disabled men who seek help m
committing suicide. Similarly, the movie THE ELEPHANT MAN (Paramount Pictures 1980),
which shows prejudice as a major obstacle for a disabled man, ends with the title character
committing suicide. Longmore states that "[w]hether they focus on prejudice or paralysis,
all of these stories tell us that disability causes social death, which m turn makes physical
death preferable. Thus the point being made is better dead than disabled." Longmore,
supra note 241, at 152.
Not all plays and movies featuring persons with disabilities end m suicide, of course,
but even critically acclaimed ones which have "happy" endings often feature disabled
characters who discuss or attempt suicide as a major part of the plot. See, e.g., FORREST
GUMP (Paramount 1994) (involving amputee); SCENT OF A WOMAN (Universal 1993)
(involving blinded former Army colonel).
245. Miller, supra note 241, at 48; see also Field, supra note 241, at 87-88. Field
stated:
There is a societal cut of "normalcy" that leads to the devaluation of persons with
retardation and other handicaps or unusual conditions, especially by people who
have little experience with the populations they devalue. Such persons may truly
believe that a child with a serious disability is "better off dead," because it seems
to them so terrible to have a handicap.
Id. This double standard was most visibly demonstrated m the Social Darwinism and
eugemcs movements of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The ultimate culmination of
these movements was Germany's forced killing of over 200,000 persons with disabilities.
An exhaustive study of the German "euthanasia" program and an excellent overview of
eugemcs in the Umted States and Europe can be found in HUGH GREGORY GALLAGHER, BY
TRUST BETRAYED: PATIENTS, PHYSICIANS, AND THE LICENSE TO KILL IN THE THIRD REICH
(2d ed. 1995).
In the United States, the eugenics movement's most visible manifestation was the
mandatory sterilization of persons with disabilities. Sterilization laws were on the books in
28 states by 1937, and 17 states still had them in the late 1950s. See Burgdorf & Burgdorf,
supra note 242, at 861. Nearly 64,000 sterilization procedures had been performed by
1964. See Drimmer, supra note 242, at 1368-69 n.121. These laws survived a constitutional challenge in Buck v. Bell, in which Justice Holmes upheld Virginia's sterilization of
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This double standard exists based upon society's prejudice against persons with disabilities.
Many able-bodied persons are tremendously fearful about
becoming disabled. This fear is based upon the notion that a disabled
person's life is inferior to, and less precious than, an able-bodied person's life.'

Miller states that this fear is at the root of prejudice against persons
with disabilities. He states that of the many sources of such prejudice,
[floremost is that of fear: fear of the loss of autonomy and the "there but
for the grace of God go I" realization that disability can "afflict" any
person. Such fears are, of course, based on a prejudicial assumption
about life with a disability that society itself creates. Able-bodied people
see "confinement" to a wheelchair, or reliance upon attendant care, or a
lack of hearing or vision, as losses of independence, which, m this
society, is often regarded as worse than death itself.24 7
a "feeble-minded" woman with his infamous statement: "Three generations of imbeciles are
enough." Buck v Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 274 (1927). The factual and procedural flaws in
Buck are discussed m Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr. & Marcia P Burgdorf, The Wicked Witch Is
Almost Dead: Buck v Bell and the Sterilizationof HandicappedPersons, 50 TEMP L.Q.
995 (1977); Charles P Kindregan, Sixty Years of Compulsory Eugenic Sterilization: "Three
Generations of Imbeciles" and the Constitution of the United States, 43 CHI.-KENT L. REV
123 (1966); and Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on Buck
v Bell, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV 30 (1985).
The view that persons with disabilities hurt society was still evident m a 1991 Louis
Hams and Associates poll on public attitudes toward people with disabilities. Sixteen percent of respondents said that they felt anger "because disabled people are an mconvenience,"
and nine percent said that they felt resentment at the "special privileges disabled people
receive."

SHAPIRO, supra note 242, at 328-29.

246. Miller, supra note 241, at 48-49.
247 Id. at 53. The fear of becoming disabled is reflected m the 1991 Louis Harris and
Associates poll on public attitudes toward people with disabilities. Conducted for the
National Organization on Disability, the poll found that 92% of respondents said that they
usually felt admiration when they met people with severe disabilities, 74% said that they felt
pity, and 47% said that they reacted with fear "because what happened to the disabled
person might happen to them." SHAPIRO, supra note 242, at 328.

One commentator recognized a number of possible bases for the fear of disability1. Persons with disabilities representa threat to the body image of the
nondisabled.
2. The observation of a person with a disability reawakens the castration
anxiety. This is particularly true when seeing a person with a missing part of the
body
3. Encountering a person with a disability brings to the forefront the fear
of losing one's physical integrity. Almost everyone is cognizant that there is a
very thin line between having a disability and being nondisabled. An accident
or disease may at any time change our status from nondisabled to disabled, and
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B. The Depiction of Disabilityin Right-to-Die Case LawLives Not Worth Living
The societal prejudice against disability can be seen m the few right-todie cases brought by fully cogmzant persons with disabilities who wanted

judicial approval for the removal of respirators or feeding tubes. In these
cases, courts focus entirely on the plaintiff's physical limitations, ignoring
stresses in other areas of their lives, and conclude that life with these
limitations is not worth living. In short, "[w]hen the nondisabled say they
want to die, they are labeled as suicidal; if they are disabled, it is treated

as 'natural' or 'reasonable."'

2

4

it is this uncertainty and more importantly the lack of control one may have m
his status change which creates this fear.
4. Association with persons who have disabilities may create the fear of
contamination or inheritance of the disability Although most conditions that
create limitations cannot be contracted, especially when proper medical treatment
has been applied, the idea of contamination does exist. For some it is subconscious and for others it is a real conscious belief.
5. Persons with disabilities rekindle separationanxieties. All children
experience this anxiety as it relates to being separated from parents and as we
grow older these anxieties are repressed. As adults we experience them occasionally as fears of being separated from children, spouse and other loved ones.
In encountering a person with a disability, similar fears emerge with regard to
loss of limbs or other body parts similar to the fears of losing one's physical

integrity
BRYAN, supra note 242, at 110 (citing Hanoch Liveneh, On the Originsof Negative Attitudes
Towards People with Disabilities,in THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL IMPACT OF PHYSICAL
DISABILITY 167-84 (Robert P Marinelli & Arthur E. Dell Orto eds., 1984)).
Whatever the source of the fear of disability, it is reflected in the terminology often
used to describe persons with disabilities, and one commentator has noted:
Disabled people need to get nervous when professionals and the media use
phrases like "imprisoned by her body," "helpless," "suffering needlessly," and
"quality versus quantity of life." These phrases purport to be humanistic and
compassionate, but they really express very primitive human fears of severe
disability and a very misguided condemnation, "I could never live like that."
Disabled people need to get very nervous because society is translating these
primitive emotions into a supposedly rational social policy of assisted suicide,
i.e., euthanasia.
Diane Coleman, Growing Support of the Right to Die a Worrisome Trend, NAsHvILLE
BANNER, May 10, 1990, at A19, quoted in Stanley S. Herr et al., No Place to Go: Refusal
of Life-Sustaining Treatment by Competent Persons with PhysicalDisabilities, 8 ISSUES L.
& MED. 3, 32 (1992).
248. Compassion m Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 838 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (citing
Gill, supra note 241, at 38-39), cert. granted sub nom. Washington v Glucksberg, 65
U.S.L.W 3218 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (No. 96-110)
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1. Bouvia v Superior Court
The first case to address the propriety of withdrawing treatment from
a competent person with a physical disability was Bouvia v Superior
Court. Elizabeth Bouvia was bom with cerebral palsy and was a quadriplegic. 250 Her parents divorced when she was five years old, and her
mother was given custody z1 Her mother remarried when Bouvia was ten,
and she was put in an institution for handicapped children.' z Bouvia was
moved from facility to facility during the next eight years, during which
time her mother rarely visited her. 3 At eighteen, she moved out into the
community, and for eight years she lived independently, assisted by aides
she paid through a California governmental program called In-Home Supportive Services. 4 She earned an associate's degree at a community
college and then received her bachelor of arts and began graduate work at
San Diego State University I She married Richard Bouvia. 6
Her personal life soon took on additional stresses. The local hospital
where she was initially placed for field work m her social work graduate
program refused to make accommodations for her disability, and she received no assistance from San Diego State.'5 In fact, one of her professors
reportedly told her she was unemployable and that if the school had known
how disabled she was, she would never have been admitted to the master's
program.258
Bouvia became pregnant, but suffered a miscarnage. 9 Her brother
drowned,' and she and her husband separated and later filed for divorce."
Severely depressed, Bouvia checked herself into the psychiatric unit of
Riverside County Hospital, stated that she wished to end her life, and asked
the hospital to assist her. 6 2 The hospital refused, and a court in that county
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct. App. 1986).
Bouvia v Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 299 (Ct. App. 1986).
Longmore, supra note 241, at 153.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 154.
Id. at 156.
Id. at 154.
Id.
Id. at 156.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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denied her petition to "starve herself to death." 3 Bouvia's friends took her
to several different facilities, both public and private, in an effort to find a
hospital that would allow her to accomplish her goal.' 4 She ultimately
ended up in a public hospital in Los Angeles County and there resumed
litigation seeking the right to terminate her life.' Specifically, she sought
the removal of a nasogastnc tube that she said was "inserted and maintained
against her will and without her consent"' for the purpose of keeping her
alive through involuntary forced-feeding.7
In its opimon granting Bouvia's request, the California Court of
Appeals did not see fit even to mention the severe emotional stress arising
from Bouvia's mscarriage, separation, and problems in school. Instead,
it focused solely on her disability[Bouvia's] physical handicaps of palsy and quadriplegia have progressed
to the point where she is completely bedridden. Except for a few
fingers of one hand and some slight head and facial movements, she is
immobile. She is physically helpless and wholly unable to care for
herself. She is totally dependent upon others for all of her needs.
These include feeding, washing, cleaning, toileting, turning, and helping
her with elimination and other bodily functions. She cannot stand or sit
upright in bed or in a wheelchair. She lies flat in bed and must do so
the rest of her life. She suffers also from degenerative and severely
crippling arthritis. She is m continual pain. Another tube permanently
attached to her chest automatically ijects her with periodic doses of
morphine which relieves some, but not all of her physical pain and
discomfort.'
The court concluded that this life was indeed not worth living:6 9
[Bouvia] would have to be fed, cleaned, turned, bedded, toileted, by
others for 15 to 20 years! Although alert, bright, sensitive, perhaps
even brave and feisty, she must lie immobile, unable to exist except
through physical acts of others. Her mind and spirit may be free to take
great flights but she herself is imprisoned and must lie physically
helpless subject to the ignominy, embarrassment, humiliation and dehumanizing aspects created by her helplessness. We do not believe it is
263. Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 298.

267 Id.
268. Id. at 300.
269. Id. at 300-05.
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the policy of this State that all and every life must be preserved against
the will of the sufferer. It is incongruous, if not monstrous, for medical
petitioners to assert the right to preserve a life that someone else must
live, or more accurately, endure for 15 to 20 years. We cannot
conceive it to be the policy of this State to inflict such an ordeal upon
anyone.?
2. State v McAfee

Similar language is found m a decision involving a quadriplegic's
request to be removed from a ventilator. 1 Larry McAfee was a quadriplegic as a result of a motorcycle accident. 2'

At the time of his accident,

McAfee worked full-time at an engineering firm in Atlanta while completing his engineering degree at Georgia Tech.?

Within seventeen months

of his injury, the cost of his hospitalization, rehabilitation, and home health
care had consumed all of his $1 million insurance coverage, and McAfee
became dependent on state Medicaid funding. 4 McAfee's parents could
not take him into their home and pay for his care, and Georgia's Medicaid
program would not pay for home health care.' Georgia Medicaid would
pay a skilled nursing home one hundred dollars per day for McAfee's care,
but no nursing home in the state would accept him because this payment
was too low for the care of clients who used respirators. 6 Other states
270. Id. at 305. The California Supreme Court later followed Bouvia and held that a
quadriplegic prison inmate who refused to eat had a constitutional right to refuse medical
treatment and could not be force fed through the insertion of a feeding tube. Thor v
Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375, 383 (Cal. 1993) (en banc). Other courts are split on the
issue of whether prisoners have a right to refuse life-sustamnng medical treatment including
force-feeding when they seek to starve themselves. See Singletary v Costello, 665 So. 2d
1099, 1104 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that inmate who had gone on hunger strike
to protest actions of Department of Corrections had right under state constitution to refuse
life-saving medical procedures; inmate's constitutional right to refuse nonconsensual medical
treatment was not vitiated by fact that he was incarcerated); State ex reL Schuetzle v Vogel,
537 N.W.2d 358, 361 (N.D. 1995) (holding that because prison requirement that prisoner
with diabetes take his medication was related to legitimate penological interests, prison
officials could require prisoner to submit to diabetes monitoring and, if ordered by physician, provision of food, insulin, and other medications); Laurie v Senecal, 666 A.2d 806,
807 (R.I. 1995) (holding that prisoner who did not have terminal illness did not have
constitutional right to commit suicide by refusing to eat and could be force fed).
271. See State v McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651, 652 (Ga. 1989).
272. Id. at 651.
273. See SHAPIRO, supra note 242, at 262.
274. Id. at 265.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 265-66.
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paid nursing homes more, and McAfee was moved to a nursing home
near Cleveland because Oio paid nearly three hundred dollars per day
to care for clients on respirators.' After McAfee filed complaints with
Ohio officials about his poor care there, the nursing home transferred
McAfee by ambulance plane to Grady Memorial Hospital m Atlanta."
Georgia Medicaid had granted the Ohio nursing home permission to transfer McAfee, but did not inform Grady Hospital of the transfer until
his arrival, knowing that the hospital would not have accepted a patient
m stable condition and not m need of hospital care. 9 Grady Hospital,
however, could not discharge McAfee unless it found another place for
him, and again, no Georgia nursing home would take a client on a respirator.?
After three months m the noisy and stressful ICU where he had no
privacy and only rarely did nurses have time to get him out of bed, McAfee
called a lawyer and said that he wanted to die. 1 The state did not oppose
McAfee's petition,' and the court granted it.'
In doing so, the court did not mention McAfee's forced moves to the
Ouo nursing home and then to the Atlanta hospital. Nor did it mention his
experiences in the hospital. Like the Bouvwa court, it focused only on the
plaintiff's physical condition. The court described McAfee as being "incadependent upon a ventilator to
pable of spontaneous respiration, and
breathe. According to the record, there is no hope that Mr. McAfee's
condition will improve with time, nor is there any known medical treatment
which can improve his condition."284
3. Bouvia and McAfee Choose to Live
Given only the courts' descriptions of Bouvia's and McAfee's lives,
one would dunk that the petitioners quickly embraced death after being
granted the right to die. In fact, Bouvia is still alive today, tirteen years
277 Id. at 266.
278. Id. at 266-67
279. Id. at 267
280. Id.
281. Id. at 258, 267
282. See McAfee, 385 S.E.2d at 652 (indicating that state conceded that its interest in
preserving life did not outweigh McAfee's right to refuse medical treatment and stated in
its brief that "there is simply no basis in this case upon which the State may intervene and
oppose the exercise of Mr. McAfee's right to refuse treatment").
283. Id. at 652-53.
284. Id. at 651.
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after filing her suit,'

and McAfee died of pneumonia six years after the

Georgia court gave hun the choice of turning off Ins ventilator.'

McAfee was transferred to an Alabama nursing home with a special
wing for clients who used respirators only two days after the trial court's
hearing on his petition.' While in the nursing home, McAfee met Russ
Fine, the director of an mjury prevention research center at the Umversity
of Alabama.

8

Fine made it clear to McAfee that he supported his right to

end his life, but presented him with other options as well.2 9 An engineer
installed an environmental control system in McAfee's nursing home room
that allowed him to operate the telephone and television. 2 0 A computer
specialist who saw television news reports on McAfee flew to Alabama and
set up a voice-activated computer programmed to recognize McAfee's
voice.29

With special software, McAfee was able to make architectural

renderings of buildings and apartment layouts using a sonar beam directed
from a band strapped to his head to draw on the computer screen. 2' After
considerable pressure, including pressure from President Bush who asked
the Department of Health and Human Services to look into the matter,
Georgia Medicaid agreed to move McAfee to a new group home in
Augusta.293 McAfee found this setting to be much better and eventually

obtained a job in computer mapping. 2 4

285. See Nat Hentoff, Elizabeth Bouvia and the ACLU: "I Used to Go to the ACLU for
Help. Now They're Killing Us," VILLAGE VOICE, July 30, 1996, at 10.
286. See Right-to-Die Litigant Who Chose to Live, CmH. TRIB., Oct. 4, 1995, at 11
(reporting McAfee's death).
287

SHAPIRO, supra note 242, at 281.

288. Id. at 281-82.
289. The story of the relationship between Fine and McAfee was told m the 1993
television movie The Switch. The Switch (CBS television broadcast, Jan. 15, 1993); Ray
Richmond, CBS' "The Switch" Worth Turning On, S.F CHRON., Jan. 15, 1993, at C3;
Obituaries, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 1995, at B4 (providing obituary of McAfee). At least one
person with a disability was critical of the movie, however, as being "just another buddy
saga, where the non-disabled person saves the cripple from himself, helps the cripple see
the light and choose not to die." Marta Russell, Hollywood Needs New View of Disabled,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1993, at F3.

290. SHAPIRO, supra note 242, at 283.
291. Id. at 284.
292. Id. at 284-85.
293. Id. at 287-88.
294. Jan Gehorsam, State Seeks Fundsfor Patients' Home Care, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Mar. 17, 1992, at D12; Sandra McIntosh, News Update; People and Events That Made
Headlines:Life's "Terrific"forMcAfee at Special Nursing Home, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Dec. 29, 1991, at C2.

BETTER OFFDEAD THAN DISABLED?
Elizabeth Bouvia also chose not to take her life. She chose not to have
the feeding tube removed at the time the appellate court decision came
down because she was receiving morphine for her pam, and "because of the
treatment, it (starvation) just became more difficult to do." 2I Bouvia stated
in 1993 that she still "feel[s] the same way; I wish I could die peacefully,
but I don't know at tins point that starvation is the way to do it."I
She also reported, however, that she spent her days at the Los Angeles
County-USC Medical Center, where she had lived since 1986, reading,
listening to music, and watching television and movies.'
She used a
telephone by tapping on a lever taped to a bedrail.298 Her family visited
occasionally, and she had friends who came to see her on a weekly basis.299
She also received mail, although she had difficulty keeping up with the
correspondence because she needed someone to write for her.3°°
Bouvia worked for some time on getting out of the hospital and said
that "I hope eventually that will come to pass."" 1 Specifically, she hoped
for "an apartment situation. That way I would have a bit more privacy "'
Bouvia eventually got that wish. She now lives in an apartment with fulltime aides and goes out shopping in her wheelchair. 3"
4. McKay v Bergstedt
Kenneth Bergstedt never got an opportunity to think about living
independently like McAfee and Bouvia, but after Ins death, the Nevada
Supreme Court held that he should have and noted that tins might have
impacted his decision on whether his life was worth living."
The court's

295. Jay Homing, Bedridden Bouvia Still Strong-Willed, ST.PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr.

25, 1993, at 10A, see Jeff Wilson, Quadriplegic Carries On After Losing Controversial

Right-to-Die Case m '83; Woman Says She Has Learnedto "Accept" Her Condition, But Is
Bitter About Ruling, FRESNO BEE, Dec. 26, 1993, at D22.

296. Horning, supra note 295, at 10A. Bouvia said: "If I was going to starve to death
today it would be more difficult. The situation changed with the morphine. I've learned

to accept it." Wilson, supra note 295, at D22. At the time of the interview, she was eating
well, and her weight was up considerably from the time she filed her suit. Id.
297 Homing, supranote 295, at 10A.

298.
299.
300.
301.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

302. Id.
303. Hentoff, supra note 285, at 10.

304. See McKay v Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 624-25 (Nev 1990).
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initial description of Bergstedt was similar to those found m Bouvia and
McAfee:
At the tender age of 10, Kenneth suffered the fate of a quadriplegic as a
result of a swimming accident. Twenty-one years later, faced with what
appeared to be the mimment death of his ill father, Kenneth decided that
he wanted to be released from a life of paralysis held intact by the lifesustaining properties of a respirator.31
Bergstedt's father filed a petition on Kenneth's behalf requesting a
court order permitting the father to turn off the ventilator without liability
for murder or wrongful death and asking the court to determine that Kenneth's request was not suicidal. The lower court granted the application,
but ordered the Nevada attorney general to appeal the ruling.3° Bergstedt's
father, however, disconnected the ventilator days after the trial court's
ruling, and Bergstedt died before the Nevada Supreme Court could issue its
ruling. 3° Despite this, the court issued its opinion and noted that it had
revised certain aspects
to reflect changes necessitated by what we
consider to be the tragic and untimely demise of a young man who had
managed to create a modicum of quality m a life devastated by quadriplegia
and total dependence on artificial respiration and the care of others. 311
In its opinion, the court focused almost exclusively on the quality of
Bergstedt's life, but noted that his concerns over that quality hinged more
on a lack of adequate support services than on his physical condition. The
court noted:
It appeared that Kenneth's suffering resulted more from hIs fear of the
unknown than any source of physical pain. After more than two decades
of life as a quadriplegic under the loving care of his parents, Kenneth
understandably feared for the quality of his life after the death of his father,
who was his only surviving parent. Although Kenneth completed
elementary and high school through private tutoring, study and telephone
commuication with hIs teachers, and wrote poetry and otherwise lived a
useful and productive life, hIs physical condition was dire. His quadnplegia left him not only ventilator-dependent, but entirely reliant on others
305. Id. at 620.
306. Bergstedt v. McKay, No. A281607, slip op. at 5-6 (Nev. Dist. Ct. June 22, 1990),
cited in Diane Coleman, Withdrawing Life-Sustaimng Treatmentfrom People with Severe
DisabilitiesWho Request It: Equal Protection Considerations,8 ISSuES L. & MED. 55, 58
(1992).
307 See Coleman, supra note 306, at 58. Bergstedt's father died a few days after his
son. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d at 619 n.l.
308. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d at 619.
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for his bodily functions and needs. His limited sources of entertainment,
including reading, watching television, and writing poetry through the oral
operation of a computer, also required the attentive accommodations of
others. Since the death of his mother m 1978, all these services were
provided by his father and attending nurses occasionally called to the home.
It thus appears, and the record so reflects, that Kenneth was preoccupied with fear over the quality of Ins life after the death of his father.
He feared that some mishap would occur to his ventilator without anyone
being present to correct it, and that he would suffer an agomzing death as
a result. In contemplating his future under the care of strangers, Kenneth
stated that he had no encouraging expectations from life, did not enjoy life,
and was tired of suffering. Fear of the unknown is a common travail even
among those of us who are not impnsoned by paralysis and a total
dependency upon others. There is no doubt that Kenneth was plagued by
a sense of foreboding concerning the quality of Ins life without is father.3
Though the state had essentially agreed with Bergstedt's petition and
had taken only a "token adversarial stance" on appeal,310 the court balanced
Bergstedt's interests m avoiding the fear of the unknown against the state's
interests in preserving life and preventing suicide. It concluded that:
As medical science continues to develop methods of prolonging life, it is
not inconceivable that a person could be faced with any number of alternatives that would delay death and consign him or her to a living hell m
which there is hopelessness, total dependence, a complete lack of dignity,
and an ongoing cost that would impoverish loved ones. The State's interwhat some may erroneously refer to
ests m preserving life and preventing
311
as suicide does not extend so far.
Several disability groups attempted to help Bergstedt avoid tis "living
hell" after learning of Ins petition requesting removal of Ins ventilator.
Bergstedt's father, however, stated that his son could not come to the
phone. According to a reporter from the DisabilityRag, a disability rights
publication, Bergstedt's father said that Ins son did not like the way he
sounded using the ventilator and, because of this, would not speak on the
309. Id. at 624.
310. Id. at 619.
311. Id. at 627 One commentator remarked that:
The judicial reaction to both [Bergstedt] and Bouvia because of their disabilities
demonstrates how the new quality-of-life ethic devalues and excludes people with
physical disabilities by concurring with them that death is better than life with
severe disabilities, rather than by seeking to alleviate the pressures which make
liffe with such disabilities so difficult.
Paredes, supra note 241, at 827
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phone.3 12 A California disability group that had begun to arrange a shared

living situation and personal attendant for Bergstedt was never permitted to
talk with him about these plans.31 3 Whether Bergstedt ever learned of these
efforts cannot be known as 314
his father disconnected hIs ventilator shortly

after the trial court's ruling.

C. JudicialRecognition of the Influence of Prejudice
Against and Lack of Support Servicesfor People with Disabilities
in Right-to-Die Cases

The disability groups' efforts on Bergstedt's behalf were nonetheless
important because they were implicitly acknowledged in the Nevada
Supreme Court's opinion when it identified a state interest in "encouraging
312. See Coleman, supra note 306, at 58 (citing Unanswered Questions, DISABILITY
Sept./Oct. 1990, at 22).
313. See id.
314. Id. Many people with disabilities also tried to reach out to David Rivlin, a 38year-old quadriplegic from Michigan, when he sought to have his ventilator disconnected
in 1989. See Herr et al., supra note 247, at 14. No defendant was named in Rivlin's
action, and no one appeared to either contest it or file amicus briefs. Id. Rivlin told a
reporter: "The vent [his respirator] takes away all choice in your life. I don't want to live
an empty life lying helplessly in a nursing home for another thirty years. Death means to
me that I can just rest in peace." SHAPIRO, supra note 242, at 275. Rivlin, who had lived
m a nursing home m a Detroit suburb for three years told another reporter: "I don't want
to live the rest of my life m an institution. I've tried to figure out other ways but there [are]
none." Herr et al., supra note 247, at 14 (quoting Accident Victim: Life More Than
Surviving, DAILY REP (Coldwater, Mich.), May 20, 1989, at E8).
Rivlin declined contact with people with disabilities who wrote and called to tell hun
of ways to live outside of an institution, having apparently given up by the time of his court
proceeding. See ud. Also, before Rivlin's death, a reporter covering his story learned that
Michigan had changed its social welfare rules since the last tune Rivlin had tried to live
independently, and that by calling the social services office Rivlin could receive $333 a
RAG,

month for personal care. Id. at 15. This amount could be doubled if Rivlin was able to get

an exception, and a senior clinical social worker told the reporter that he "knew how to
work the system" and could get Rivlin even more money for a "decent system of home
care." Id. Unforamately, Rivlin's ventilator was shut off before the reporter could tell him
of these new possibilities. Id.
Rivlin's pleas for a doctor's help m ending his life inspired Dr. Jack Kevorkian,
Michigan's now infamous suicide doctor, to build his first suicide machine. See SHAPIRO,
supra note 242, at 275-76. Kevorkian met Rivlin when he sought a doctor's help m dying.
Id. at 276. See generally JACK KEvORKIAN, PRESCRIPTION - MEDICIDE: THE GOODNESS
OF PLANNED DEATH (1991). Kevorkian first used his suicide machine a few months later.
Of the forty people Kevorkian "assisted" between June 4, 1990 and September 7, 1996,
twenty-eight had diseases that were not life-threatening, and autopsies revealed that they
were not terminally ill. Thomas Maier, Waiting atDeath'sDoor, NEWSDAY, Sept. 8, 1996,
at 4-5. Nine people had multiple sclerosis. Id.
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the charitable and humane care of afflicted persons."315 In making this
acknowledgment, the Bergstedt court became one of the first to address the

problems that lead to suicide among persons with disabilities: the existence
of societal prejudice and the lack of adequate support services.
The Bergstedt court noted that there is a "clear national and State
public policy to encourage charitable contributions for the humane care and
treatment of citizens stricken with various maladies and disabilities," 316 and

that "national and State efforts to improve the circumstances of disabled
citizens are indicative of the highest social character - a society attuned to
the worth of an individual irrespective of physical or mental handicap."317
' and that his
Noting that Bergstedt was not "without a meaingful life"318
main fear was life in the care of strangers after his father's death, the court
stated that:
It appeared to us that Kenneth needed some type of assurance that society
would not cast him adrift in a sea of indifference after his father's
passing. Perhaps available governmental, private and charitable support
systems would not have been adequate to provide Kenneth the assurance
he needed to alleviate Ins fears. We nevertheless conclude that absent
Kenneth's intervening death, it would have been necessary to fully inform
him of the care alternatives that would have been available to him after
his father's death or mcapacity 319
315. See McKay v Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 628 (Nev 1990).
316. Id.
317 Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. The Bergstedt court's observation that it is the lack of support services, rather
than the disability itself, which often leads to a disabled person's request to die is in line
with commentary on the issue. One commentator has noted:
Many are wondering why society is so quick to assist a disabled person who
wants to end life when the same desire to die m an able-bodied person is viewed
as a genuine cry for help. It is the fear of no support to live independent lives,
not their disabilities, that drives people with disabilities to end their lives.
Paredes, supra note 241, at 838 (quoting National Legal Ctr. Staff, Medical Treatmentfor
Older Persons and Persons with Disabilities:1990 Developments, 6 ISSUES L. & MED. 341,
349 (1991)).
Paredes further stated:
[R]ather than assuming that life [with a disability] lacks quality due to disability,
decision-makers should question "whether the apparent nusery is the result of a
lack of adequate support services for the person. If, as is more likely, the issue
is one of inadequate support services, the answer is clearly to demand that those
services be provided."
Id. (quoting Christopher Newell, Lives of Inestimable Value: Lie Worthy of Life, 7 ISSUES
L. & MED. 245, 251 (1991)).
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The court made tius informational disclosure a requirement of the
procedure for withdrawal of medical treatment from competent adults in the
future. Two nonattending physicians must examine the adult and determine, among other things:
If the patient is non-terminal, i.e., has an estimated life expectancy of six months or more either with or without artificial lifesupport systems, that he or she was apprised of the care options
available to the patient through governmental, charitable and private
sources with due regard for the value of life, and [then] certify m
writing without liability except for fraud, that the aforesaid
of care alternatives was given and the patient's response
explanation
2
thereto. 0

Unfortunately, the Bergstedt court is one of the few courts to identify
a concern for persons with disabilities as a state interest in right-to-die
cases. Additionally, the other opinions containing these concerns have
either been overturned or are dissenting opinions. For example, in the
Ninth Circuit's initial ruling in Compassion in Dying, the court identified

one of the state interests in barring assisted suicide as "protecting all of
the handicapped from societal indifference and antipathy "32 The court
there noted that it had received an amicus curiae brief on behalf of
numerous residents of nursing homes and long-term care facilities" and
stated:
The vulnerability of such persons to physician-assisted suicide is
foreshadowed in the discriminatory way that a seriously disabled
person's expression of a desire to die is interpreted. When the
nondisabled say they want to die, they are labeled as suicidal; if
they are disabled, it is treated as "natural" or "reasonable." 3
The court found that "an insidious bias against the handicapped - again
coupled with a cost-saving mentality - makes them especially in need of
Washington's statutory protection."mi
320. Bergstadt, 801 P.2d at 630.
321. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 592 (9th Cir.), aff'd, 79
F.3d 790, 838 (9th Cir. 1995) (en bane), cert. granted sub nom. Washington v.
Glucksberg, 65 U.S.L.W 3218 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (No. 96-110).
322. Id.
323. Id. at 593 (citing Gill, supra note 241, at 38-39).
324. Id. Similar concern is voiced in a dissenting opinion in In re Guardianshipof
Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 459 (Wash. 1987) (en bane) (Anderson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), opimon amended, 757 P.2d 534 (Wash. 1988). Justice Anderson
noted that:
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[We have witnessed too much history to disregard how easily a society may
disvalue the lives of the "unproductive." The "angel of mercy" can become
the fanatic, bringing the "comfort" of death to some who do not clearly want
it, then to others who "would really be better off dead," and finally, to
classes of "undesirable persons," which might include the terminally ill, the
permanently unconscious, the severely senile, the pleasantly senile, the
retarded, the incurably or chronically ill, and perhaps, the aged.
In the
current environment, it may well prove convenient - and all too easy - to
move from recognition of an individual's "right to die" to a climate enforcing
a "duty to die."
Id. at 459 (quoting Mark Siegler & Alan J. Weisbard, Against the Emerging Stream:
Should Flud andNtaritionalSupport Be Discontinued?, 145 ARCHIVEs INTERNAL MED.
129, 130-31 (1985)). The state court m Cruzan did touch briefly on the danger of making
quality of life a factor in the right-to-die decisions: "Were quality of life at issue, persons
with all manner of handicaps might find the state seeking to terminate their lives." Cruzan
v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 420 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), af4'd, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
The concern about the right to die becoming a "duty to die" has also been expressed
m articles discussing requests by persons with disabilities to have life-sustaming treatment
removed:
In a society where people with disabilities are still intensely stigmatized and
largely segregated and
in a society that still refuses to acknowledge the
reality of that social oppression, the right to die will inevitably become a duty
to die. People with major disabilities will be pressured into "choosing" to
end their lives.
Longmore, supra note 241, at 158-59.
The duty to die sentiment has in fact garnered popular support. In 1984, then
Colorado governor Richard Lamm was quoted as saying that the elderly have "a duty to
die" to make way for future generations. Lamm Moves Closer to Thurd-Party Bid,
BOSTON GLOBE, June 8, 1996, at 8. Another time, he stated that tax dollars spent on care
of the mentally retarded may be wasted when, after years of care, all they could do is
"roll over." Id. Though the "duty to die" statement apparently was a misquotation, the
governor's press secretary reported that of more than 2000 cards and letters received, 648
writers opposed Lamm's published "position" while 1399 backed it. See Charles Roos,
Many Memorable Phrases Weren't Actually Spoken, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Feb. 24,
1995, at 46A.
The danger of these stereotypes was perhaps most promnnently recognized when the
Secretary of Health and Human Services denied Oregon's request for a Medicaid waiver
to implement its plan for rationing medical services to the state's Medicaid recipients. See
Letter from Louis W Sullivan, United States Secretary of Health and Human Services,
to Barbara Roberts, Governor of Oregon (Aug. 3, 1992) (with accompanying three page
"Analysis Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of the Oregon Reform
Demonstration"), repnnted in Timothy B. Flanagan, ADA Analyses of the Oregon Health
Care Plan, 9 IssuEs L. & MED. 397, 409 (1994). The Secretary's demal was based on
concerns stemming from the priontization process. The process had included a telephone
survey of the general public asking participants to assign values to different health states
based on descriptions in terms of functional impairments and symptoms associated with
a given condition. The Secretary stated that Oregon's reliance on the telephone survey
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V

Wrongful Living: The Wrong Answer to a Difficult Problem

Like the Bergstedt court and the Compassion in Dying panel, courts
faced with wrongful living cases must be "attuned to the worth of an
individual irrespective of physical or mental handicap," 3' and to the
existence of historical prejudices and lack of adequate support services for
persons with disabilities, which lead some to say that life is not worth
living. These courts should then follow the wrongful life cases and reject
the wrongful living cause of action for four compelling policy reasons:
(1) the legal recognition that "a disabled life is an injury would harm the

interest of those most directly concerned, the handicapped;" 3

(2) the

question of whether one would be better off dead is one which courts are
not equipped to handle and is antithetical to "the very nearly uniform high
value which the law and mankind has placed on human life, rather than its

absence;" '

(3) the unpossibility of calculating compensatory damages

based on the comparison between life with a disability and death; and
(4) the adequate remedies available under traditional tort principles for
those whose refusal of treatment is not honored.
may have "quantified stereotypic assumptions about persons with disabilities." Id. at 410.
In addition, in ranking the 709 condition-treatment pairs and making its final hand

adjustments, the Oregon Health Services Commission partially relied on "certain community values, including 'quality of life' and 'ability to function.'" Id. at 411. In these
facets of the pnoritization process, the Secretary found "considerable evidence that [the
list] was based m substantial part on the premise that the value of the life of a person with
a disability is less than the value of the life of a person without a disability. This is a
premise that is inconsistent with the ADA." Id. at 410. He concluded that "any methodology that would intentionally ration health care resources by associating quality of life
considerations with disabilities does not comport with the mandate of the ADA." Id. at
411. For commentary on health care rationing and persons with disabilities, see generally
Mary Crossley, Medical Futility and Disability Discrinunation, 81 IOWA L. REV 179
(1995); David Orentlicher, DestructunngDisability:Rationing of Health Care and Unfair
DiscrinationAgainst the Sick, 31 HARV C.R.-C.L. L. REV 49 (1996); Giles R.
Scofield, Medical Futifty Judgments:Discriminatingor Discnrnunatory', 25 SEToN HALL
L. Rnv. 927 (1995); James V Garvey, Note, Health Care Rationing and the Americans
with DisabilitiesAct of 1990: What Protection Should the Disabled Be Afforded?, 68
NOTRE DAME L. REv 581 (1993); Greg P Roggin, Note, The "OregonPlan" and the
ADA: Toward Reconciliation, 45 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 219 (1994); Nancy
K. Stade, Note, The Use of Quality-of-Life Measures to Ration Health Care: Reviving a
Rejected Proposal, 93 CoLUm. L. REV 1985 (1993); and Note, The Oregon Health Care
Proposaland the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 106 HARV L. REV 1296 (1993).
325. McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 628 (Nev. 1990).
326. Smith v Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 352-53 (N.H. 1986).
327 Greco v. United States, 893 P.2d 345, 347-48 (Nev. 1995) (quoting Becker v.
Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y 1978)).
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A. Recognition of a Wrongful Living Cause of Action Would
Harm Personswith Disabilities
As Elizabeth Bouvia, Larry McAfee, and countless others illustrate,
even life with severe physical handicaps can have a certain quality if people
with disabilities are given the support services they need.3 2 Unfortunately,
a person reading the Bouvia and McAfee decisions is not likely to know the
nonphysical stresses in their lives before they made their requests to die or
their subsequent decisions to live. Instead, the reader will work only from
the courts' descriptions of their lives. As one commentator has pointed out,
the Bouvia court's "characterization of the life of a quadriplegic promotes
a social attitude likely to at least indirectly influence the choices of disabled
persons in the future." 3" A finding that a life with a disability is not worth
328. Indeed, Franklin D. Roosevelt, arguably our greatest president, guided the
United States through the Great Depression and World War H though paralyzed by polio.
America's - and FDR's own - difficulty in accepting that disability are chromcled in
HUGH GREGORY GALLAGHER, FDR's SPLENDID DECEPriON (1985). The importance of
FDR's disability continues to be an issue to this day, as evidenced by the debate over
whether he should be depicted in a wheelchair in the memorial currently being built in
Washington. People with disabilities argue that the failure to show FDR in a wheelchair
is a historical distortion, and it deprives people with disabilities today and in the future
of a valuable role model. See FDR Memorial Keeps Wheelchair Hidden, PHOENIX
GAZErI, May 17, 1996, at A35. Others argue that Roosevelt purposefully chose to keep
his disability hidden for personal as well as political reasons, and that the goals of
advancing disability perception do not justify violating his self-image. See Charles
Krauthammer, Defining the Image of FDR, CHI. TRIB., June 17, 1996, at 15.
329. Donald L. Beschle, The Role of Courts in the Debate on Assisted Suicide: A
CommunitarianApproach, 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 367, 377 (1995).
Beschle later states that he finds what he terms the "libertarian" approach to assisted
suicide disturbing because of
its tendency to absolve us, as individuals or as a society, from a sense of
responsibility to others. Do we provide enough supportfor the handicapped?
Does medicine devote attention to the relief of pain? Does the absence of
universal health care insurance make people choose an earlier death in order
not to financially burden their relatives? Do social attitudes emphasizing the
importanceofphysical perfection send disturbing messages about what type of
life is not worth living? If suicide is merely an act of autonomy, we need not
address these questions.
Id. at 380 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Disability advocates asked to provide testimony to Congress on the assisted suicide
issue used more forceful language in discussing their concerns about the view toward
disability seen in the right-to-die cases. Diane Coleman, a lawyer and the executive
director of the Progress Center for Independent Living, and Carol Gill, Ph.D., of the
Chicago Institute of Disability Research, stated:

218

54 WASH. & LEE L. REV 149 (1997)

living could have a similar impact, and this should be a concern of courts
faced with wrongful living actions as it has been for those courts ruling on
wrongful life actions.
In Smith v Cole, the court listed as among its policy reasons for
rejecting a wrongful life action the fact that:
Legal recognition that a disabled life is an mjury would harm the interests of those most directly concerned, the handicapped. Disabled persons
face obvious physical difficulties in conducting their lives. They also
face the subtle yet equally devastating handicaps of the attitudes and
behavior of society, the law, and their own families and friends.
Furthermore, society often views disabled persons as burdensome misfits.
Recent legislation concerning employment, education, and building access
reflects the slow change in these attitudes. This change evidences a
growing public awareness that the handicapped can be valuable and
productive members of society To characterize the life of a disabled

No court, or professional whose judgment the courts respected, examined
the suicidal feelings of Elizabeth Bouvia, David Rivlin, Larry McAfee
or
Kenneth Bergstedt. All courts attributed the individuals' desire to die to their
physical disabilities per se rather than to events and circumstances in their
lives, such as a nscamage, loss of spouse, and confinement to nursing homes.
All courts superficially concluded that the individual's despair was not suicidal,
not treatable or deserving of appropriate intervention. These individuals were
granted a so-called "right to die" without being offered adequate support for
living. These highly publicized cases are the tip of an unexplored iceberg, one
that proponents of physician-assisted suicide prefer to ignore. But the legal
foundation for applying physician-assisted suicide to non-terminal people with
disabilities is already firmly entrenched in our judicial system, and disabled
people are beginning to feel that we are riding on the Titanic.
Testimony of Diane Coleman and Carol Gill Before the Constitution Subcommittee of the
House Judiciary Committee, Apr. 29, 1996, at *4, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
CNGTST File.
Coleman and others have also taken their concerns to the streets. She is a spokeswoman for "Not Dead Yet," a disability rights group that demonstrated in front of Jack
Kevorluan's house after his recent acquittal on assisted suicide charges. See Disabled
Demonstrate at Kevorlaan'sHouse, ST. Louis PosT-DIsPATCH, June 22, 1996, at 5A.

One woman poured fake blood on the ground and lay down in Kevorkian's front lawn;
another, who used a ventilator to breath, covered herself in a white sheet and held a
sign that said "Kevorkian Kills Krlps." Id., see also Nat Hentoff, Not Dead Yet,
WASH. POST, June 8, 1996, at A15. Not Dead Yet members also demonstrated outside
both the Supreme Court and Kevorkian's home on the morning of the Supreme Court
arguments for the assisted suicide cases. See Sandy Banisky, Protesters Fear Ruling

Could Be Death Sentence; Disabled Urge Ban on Assisted Suicide, BALT. SUN, Jan. 9,
1997, at 13A, Doug Durfee, Group Gathers at Kevorklan'sHome, DET. NEWS, Jan. 9,
1997, at 4A.
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person as an injury would denigrate both this new awareness and the
handicappedthemselves. 3I

This reasoning is equally applicable to the wrongful living cause of
action and is even more relevant today because Congress enacted the most
important piece of civil rights legislation for persons with disabilities after
the Smith court wrote this passage. The Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA),33 ' signed on July 26, 1990, for the first time extended federal
disability rights law into the private sector,33 prohibiting employment
discrtmnation on the basis of disability333 and requiring that public accommodations,31' governmental services,335 transportation,335 and telecommuications 337 be accessible to the disabled. The ADA is
based on the premise that disability is a natural part of the human
experience and in no way diminishes the nghts of individuals to live
independently, pursue meaningful careers and enjoy full mclusion in the
economic, political, cultural and educational mainstream of American
society 338

Judicial approval of a wrongful living tort, in which a court would
declare a person to be better off dead than disabled, would mark a step
back from this recognition that persons with disabilities can be valuable
and productive members of society Doing so would denigrate the
significant step marked by the ADA, persons with disabilities them330. Smith, 513 A.2d at 353 (quoting Menott & Zunzolo, supra note 31, at 459-60
(emphasis added) (citations omitted)); see Proffitt v Bartolo, 412 N.W.2d 232, 240 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1987).
331. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994)).
332. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994). Previous disability rights laws had applied only to the
federal government or the recipients of federal funds. See, e.g., Architectural Barriers Act
of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-480,82 Stat. 718 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151-4157
(1994)); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994)).
333. 42 U.S.C. § 12112.
334. Id. § 12182.
335. Id. § 12132.
336. Id. §§ 12141-12165, 12184-12186.
337 47 U.S.C. §§ 225(a)(3), 225(b) (1994).
338. Paul Steven Miller, Letters to the Editor, ADA Gives Us Our Full Civil Rights,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 1995, at 23. Mr. Miller signed the letter m his capacity as
Comissioner of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Id. A discussion
of Congress's findings and purposes in enacting the ADA can be found at supra note
242.
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selves, and what the Berman v Allan court characterized as "[o]ne of the
most deeply held beliefs of our society is that life - whether experienced
with 339
or without a major physical handicap - is more precious than nonlife."
B. Courts Cannot Answer the Question of Whether Life with a
DisabilityIs Worth Lving
Whether this belief is as deeply held as the Berman court suggests and I have argued above that it is not - courts faced with wrongful living
claims may still reject them based on an analogy to the reasons commonly
given for refusing wrongful life claims. The first reason is a conceptual
unwillingness to recognize damages for being born with a disability as
opposed to not being born at all.' This unwillingness should also extend
to wrongful living actions in which plaintiffs seek damages for being alive
as opposed to being dead.
In Greco v United States, the Supreme Court of Nevada noted that:
Whether it is better never to have been born at all than to have been
born with even gross deficiencies is a mystery more properly to be
left to the philosophers and the theologians. Surely the law can
assert no competence to resolve the issue, particularly in view of the
very nearly uniform high value which the law and mankind has
placed on human life, rather than its absence. 341
The same difficulties in comparing life to nonlife exist in wrongful
living cases: the plaintiffs seek compensation for living life in an impaired
condition as opposed to being allowed to die. This claim also calls for
courts to measure the benefits of life against nonexistence.
Knapp and Hamilton attempt to get around this difficulty by distinguishing wrongful living and wrongful life cases. They state:
In contrast to the "wrongful life" concept, the "wrongful living"
plaintiff does not assert a right to make a retrospective decision about
whether to be born, that is, to speculate about what decision the
plaintiff would have made had the future been known to the plaintiff
339. Berman v Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 12 (N.J. 1979) (citations omitted).
340. See Sienemee v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691, 697 (Ill.
1987); Cowe
v Forum Group, Inc., 575 N.E.2d 630, 634 (Ind. 1991).
341. Greco v United States, 893 P.2d 345, 348 (Nev 1995); see also Nelson v
Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 925 (Tex. 1984) (stating that perplexities involved in comparing
relative benefits of life and nonexistence render it "impossible" to decide question of injury
in wrongful life case).
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prior to conception or in utero. The "wrongful living" plaintiff
weighed the effects of his medical therapy and his prognosis with
and
3 42
without the therapy, against the desirability of remaining alive.
This argument ignores the fundamental similarity between the two
causes of action: the plaintiffs in both argue that they would be better off
dead and that they are entitled to damages due to the quality of their lives.
In doing so, the plaintiffs ask the court to make an objective decision about
the worth of their lives as opposed to nonexistence. As one court ruling
against a wrongful life claim noted, this differs greatly from the typical
right-to-die case in which
[t]he court avoids making an objective judgment as to the value of
the plaintiff's life; it strives, instead, to protect the individual's
subjective will. Even when the plaintiff is incompetent, "the court
does not arrogate to itself the individual's choice," but instead allows
the plaintiff's guardian or surrogate to make that choice on his
behalf.
The same cannot be said of wrongful life cases. At issue is not
protection of the [plaintiff's] nght to choose non-existence over life,
but whether legal injury has occurred as a result of the defendant's
conduct. The necessary inquiry is objective, not subjective; the court
cannot avoid assessing the "worth" of the [plaintiffs] life: Simply
put, the judiciary has an important role to play in protecting the
privacy rights of the dying. It has no business declaring that among
the living are people who never should have been born.343
Similarly, the necessary inquiry in a wrongful living case is objective,
not subjective, and the court is required to opine on the worth of the
plaintiff's life. More specifically, the court must decide if that worth is so
minimal that the person would be better off dead and is entitled to
compensation for living. This is a decision the judiciary is not equipped to
make, and accordingly, it has no business declaring that among the living
are people who are better off dead.
C. Wrongful Living DamagesAre Incalculable:
It Is Impossible to Compare and Place a Value on Life
with a Disabilityvs. Death
Oddi stated in his article that wrongful living could be distinguished
from wrongful life because the "difficulty with the 'wrongful life' cases is
342. Knapp & Hamilton, supranote 18, at 258 (citations omitted).
343. Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 352-53 (N.H. 1986) (citations omitted).
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the damages element, because a comparison must be made between nonlife
and life in an impaired condition." " He then said, however, that the
action seeks compensation for living and the possible damages are those
"for the tme period that the patient survived due to the interfering treatment." 45 If this is the case, a wrongful living action, just as a wrongful
life action, involves the calculation of damages based on life as opposed to
nonlife.
One court discussing the difficulty of making such a calculation stated:
The basic rule of tort compensation is that the plaintiff be put in the
position that he would have been in absent the defendant's
negligence. The damages recoverable on behalf of a child for
wrongful life are limited to those necessary to restore the child to the
position he would have occupied were it not for the alleged
malpractice of the physician or other health care provider. In a
wrongful life case, there is no allegation that but for the defendant's
negligence the child would have had a healthy, unimpaired life.
Instead, the claim is that without the defendant's negligence, the
child never would have been born. Thus the cause of action
involves a calculation of damages dependent upon the relative
benefits of an impaired life as opposed to no life at all, "[a] comparison the law is not equipped to make. "346
The law is also not equipped to make the comparison between life and
nonlife in a wrongful living action. There are no damages available that
can put the patient in the position in which he would have been if not for
the health care provider's failure to honor the advance directive: if the
defendant had not acted, the plaintiff would be dead. A computation of
damages "would require the trier of fact to measure the difference in value
between life in an impaired condition and the 'utter void of nonexistence.'
[Mian 'who
Such an endeavor, however, is literally inpossible.
knows nothing of death or nothingness,' simply cannot affix a price tag to
non-life. "I
344. Oddi, supranote 18, at 641 n.75.
345. Id. at 648. Oddi later states that "the loss to the patient asserting the right to die
is the prolongation of life." Id. at 661.
346. Siemiemec v Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691, 697 (IlI. 1987) (quoting
Becker v Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. 1978)). The court's statement on the
purpose of tort law is consistent with that found m the Restatement, which provides that "the
law of torts attempts primarily to put an injured person m a position as nearly as possible

equivalent to his position prior to the tort."
a (1965).
347
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Berman v Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 12 (N.J. 1979) (citations omitted).
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D Adequate Remedies for Failureto HonorAdvance Directives
Exist Under TraditionalTort Principles

Courts need not take on the impossible task of deciding whether a life
with a disability is worth living because, as Pedrick notes, the "familiar
principles of tort law can be enlisted to better assure that unwanted lifesupport measures either will not be used, or will be withdrawn when that
is the wish of the patient or the patient's agent."3" Pedrick further
comments that "when health care givers subject a competent patient to life
sustaining procedures against his or her will, the settled law of torts

provides a remedy by way of an action for battery, with resultant liability
on the part of health care givers for substantial damages, both general and
punitive. "I'
A battery action for unauthorized medical treatment is a matter of
hombook law that the Supreme Court recognized in Cruzan.35° Health care
providers who act mngood faith will have no reason to fear a battery claim
because of the protections provided in living will and proxy statutes35' and
because of the requirement that a battery be intentional.352 A physician who
348. Pednck, Arizona Tort Law, supra note 108, at 390. Pedrick's statement follows
a discussion of living will statutes. Hence, he is suggesting that the use of tort principles
will be more successful in assuring the right to die than the enactment of statutes. The
author has borrowed Pedrick's statement to suggest that the use of such familiar principles
will also be more valuable in achieving that goal than recognition of the wrongful living
cause of action.
349. Id. at 396. Pedrick also suggests that Medicare officials and insurance companies
should routinely ask whether the health care provider has received instructions declining the
use of life-support systems before the patient's death. Id. at 399. In such a case, he says
these third parties should refuse to pay for medical services rendered after the health care
provider knew of the patient's wishes to refuse treatment. Id. He states:
Such a policy adopted by Medicare, Medicaid, and the health insurance mdustry would
have a salutary effect in bringing an effective sanction to bear
on health care givers, and through fiscal persuasion, should bring them to
honor the instructions of patients and surrogate agents on this subject.
Id., see Gasner, supra note 17, at 512-15 (arguing that providing financial disincentives to
continuing treatment by refusing to reimburse providers for unwanted services is promising
enforcement mechanism for individual's right to refuse treatment).
350. See Cruzan v Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990).
351. All state living will and health care proxy statutes confer some sort of inmunity
from civil or criminal liability or both on health care providers who in good faith comply
with a properly executed living will or the instructions of a proxy acting in accordance with
the patient's wishes or in the patient's best interest. See 2 MEISEL, supra note 11, § 11.17
(citing living will statutes); id. § 12.46 (citing proxy statutes).
352. Section 13 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS provides:
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knowingly ignores a patient's advance directive, however, would be liable
for battery and subject to damages. Indeed, the Anderson court held that

a person who was given life-sustaining treatment against his wishes was
entitled to damages resulting from the "natural and continuous sequence
medical
including all
following the unwanted resuscitative effort
death, the costs of [a] nursing home, and any
expenses
until
extraordinary expenses related to [the patient's] care."353
An actor is subject to liability to another for battery if
(a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person
, and
of the other or a third person
(b) a harmful contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly
results.
RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965). A comment states that:
[A] surgeon who performs an operation upon a patient who has refused to
submit to it is not relieved from liability by the fact that he honestly and,
indeed, justifiably believes that the operation is necessary to save the patient's
life. Indeed, the fact that medical testimony shows that the patient would
have died had the operation not been performed and that the operation has
effected a complete cure is not enough to relieve the physician from liability
Id. § 13 cmt. c.
353. Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., No. C-930819, 1995 WL 109128,
at * 5 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 15, 1995), rev'd, 671 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1996). This holding
was reversed on appeal because of a failure to show any connection between the defibrillation and Winter's subsequent stroke. Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 228. The Ohio Supreme
Court found that:
[The record is devoid of any evidence that the administering of the resuscitative measures caused the stroke. Wmter suffered the stroke because the nurse
enabled him to survive the ventricular tachycardia. Because the nurse
prolonged Winter's life, numerous injuries occurring after resuscitation might
be foreseeable, but would not be caused by the defibrillation.

Id.
The court decided that the only damages that Winter's estate could recover were those
due directly to the battery Id. at 229. It then found that Winter suffered "no damages
as a result of the defibrillation of his heart, i.e., no tissue bums or broken bones," and

thus, his estate could not recover against the hospital. Id. The court stated, however, that
its decision did not mean unwanted life-saving treatment would go undeterred:
Where a patient clearly delimits the medical measures he or she is willing to
undergo, and a health care provider disregards such instructions, the consequences for that breach would include the damages arising from any battery
inflicted on the patient, as well as appropriate licensing sanctions against the
medical professionals.

Id.
This holding focuses too narrowly on the unwanted treatment itself. The damages
resulting from the battery when a patient has specifically asked not to be resuscitated
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Such a holding is consistent with the majority of wrongful birth cases,
which allow parents to recover for the extraordinary medical and other
expenses related to raising a child with a disability, but do not provide
compensation for living.354 One commentator noted:
Like the parents of such children, the families of dying patients, must
also bear the cost of extensive, long-term, intensive care medicme
If nothing else, hospitals and physicians should at least bear
the cost of the unwanted medical care when it is given over the
competent, express refusal of the patient.' 5
necessarily include all future medical expenses: If the patient had not been resuscitated,
he would not be alive to incur these expenses. Even if there is no evidence that the
resuscitation caused the subsequent medical problems, those problems can be said to have
resulted from the health care provider's actions because they would not have occurred
otherwise. The Ohio Supreme Court was correct, however, to deny emotional distress
damages. The Ohio Court of Appeals stated that Winter's estate could recover for his
"pam, suffering and emotional distress related to having a stroke." Anderson, 1995 WL
109128, at *5. Such a claim necessarily seeks compensation for living with a disability
as opposed to being dead and, as the Ohio Supreme Court stated, involves a "theory of
recovery
identical to the theory
underlying a claim for 'wrongful living.'"
Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 228. As such, emotional distress damages should be barred for
the same reasons as the wrongful living cause of action.
354. See Smith-Groff, supranote 240, at 140-43 & nn.47-67 (discussing case law on
issue).
355. Dooling, supra note 108, at 917 Pednck also argues that punitive damages
could be available for the failure to honor a patient's advance directive:
The physician who continues to treat the patient and who disregards the
patient's instructions forbidding use of life-sustaining procedures is chargeable with a conscious, knowing disregard of the patient's legal right. Such
knowing disregard for the patient's legal right, whether for good motives or
ill, cannot be tolerated. Pumtive damages are appropriate in these cases,
regardless of the health care giver's motive in disregarding the patient's
instructions.
Pedrick, Anzona Tort Law, supra note 108, at 82.
Pedrick also states that close relatives who witness a family member's suffering after
a physician's intentional refusal to honor an advance directive may bring emotional
distress claims. Id. at 83. He argues that health care givers are chargeable with knowledge of the family's emotional distress if the patient's wishes are disregarded and draws
an analogy to cases in which courts have imposed liability for emotional distress arising
out of the merely negligent handling of a dead body. Id. (citing W PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 362 (5th ed. 1984)).

These claims should be barred for the same reason as emotional distress claims
brought by the patient: they require the impossible comparison between the stress placed
on the family by the patient's survival as opposed to his death. Such a bar is in line with
the majority of wrongful birth cases that do not allow the parents of disabled infants to
recover for emotional distress arising from their birth. See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 386
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Health care providers' bearing such costs relieves patients and their
families of the burden of paying for unwanted treatment and places them in
the same economic position in which they would have been had their wishes
been honored. Tis result satisfies the "basic rule of tort compensation"
N.E.2d 807, 813-14 (N.Y 1978) (finding that emotional distress damages for parents
were too speculative); Jacobs v Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 849-50 (Tex. 1975)
(concluding that damages were too speculative as to plusses and minuses of parenting);
see also Goldberg v Ruskin, 471 N.E.2d 530, 539-40 (Il1. Ct. App. 1984) (finding that
under Illinois law, damages for emotional distress can only be recovered when emotional
distress results from physical mjury or illness); Arche v. United States, Dep't of Army,
798 P.2d 477, 481 (Kan. 1990) (stating that under Kansas law, plaintiff must witness
tortious act to recover for emotional distress).
Some courts do allow emotional distress damages as an exception to a jurisdiction's
impact rule. See, e.g., Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415, 423 (Fla. 1992) ("[Tlhese parents
went to considerable lengths to avoid the precise mjury that they now have suffered. We
conclude that public policy requires the impact doctrine not be applied within the context
of wrongful birth claims."); Naccash v Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825, 830-31 (Va. 1982)
(disallowing emotional distress damages). Other jurisdictions conclude that the parent's
emotional distress is a direct harm resulting from the defendant's negligence and is
properly included in damages. See, e.g., Keel v Banach, 624 So. 2d 1022, 1029-31
(Ariz. 1993); Berman v Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 14-15 (N.J. 1979).
Even if one accepts the holdings allowing emotional distress damages for parents in
wrongful birth actions, however, they are distinguishable from cases brought by persons
whose family members receive unwanted treatment. As the court in Benoy v. Simons
noted, wrongful birth actions are based on a doctor's breach of duty to the parents of a
disabled child as Ins patient. Benoy v Simons, 831 P.2d 167, 170 (Wash. Ct. App.
1992). There is no such relationship between the family of a person receiving unwanted
treatment and the doctor.
The Anderson court suggests that liability may also arise when the unwanted
treatment is not done intentionally, but because a health care provider fails to note the
existence of an advance directive in a patient's chart. See Anderson, 1995 WL 109128,
at *3-*4. As Oddi notes, health care providers' failure to examine available medical
records may support a negligence claim. See Oddi, supra note 18, at 661 n.160. Oddi
cites several examples: Larnorev. HomeopathicHosp. Ass'n, 181 A.2d 573, 577 (Del.
1962) (concluding that hospital was liable when nurse failed to read patient's chart before
giving rejection); Killebrew v. Johnson, 404 N.E.2d 1194, 1197-98 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)
(finding jury question on whether physician's failure to examine previously taken x-rays
constituted negligence); Smith v. Courter, 575 S.W.2d 199, 202-03 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979)
(same); and Edwards v. Means, 243 S.E.2d 161, 162 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978) (same). A
similar failure to examine the patient's chart for an advance directive could support a
malpractice claim for the expenses incurred as a result of the unwanted treatment.
A more difficult question arises as to liability for unwanted treatment when the
advance directive is never properly filed in the patient's chart. Holding health care
providers liable for the expenses resulting from the failure to place an advance directive
in a patient's chart, or to include that directive in the information accompanying the
patient upon transfer to another facility, may encourage better record-keeping practices.
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identified in Siemieniec v Lutheran GeneralHospital,356 without requiring
a court to decide whether life with a disability is worth living.
Conclusion
Advances in medical technology have drastically changed the way
physicians treat patients and how and where Americans die. Many people
die after undergoing mvasive life-sustaining treatment unheard of even fifty
years ago. In response, courts and legislatures have recognized the right
to die, stating that patients have a constitutional or common-law interest in
refusing unwanted medical treatment.
Both public opinion polls and scientific studies show that many patients
would prefer not to be placed on life-support systems. This desire,
however, is often misunderstood by health care providers. Even if the
patient's wishes are understood - and are memorialized m a living will or
other form of advance directive - they are often ignored. Patients and
families have responded m the past by suing to have the treatment stopped.
Courts have granted their requests, but in doing so they have often reflected
a societal prejudice that life with a disability is not worth living.
Recognition of the right to die has now spawned a different kind of
lawsuit: suits for damages alleging that patients who received unwanted lifesustaining treatment have suffered a compensable injury Most of these
suits have been brought under traditional tort principles, but plaintiffs have
also sought recognition of a new tort: wrongful living. This tort action
seeks compensation for living and is essentially a claim that an individual's
diminished quality of life after or while receiving the treatment makes life
not worth living and that they would be better off dead.
Courts should reject such actions. Judicial approval of a wrongful
living tort, in which a court would declare a person to be better off dead
than disabled, would mark a step back from the recent recognition in the
ADA that persons with disabilities can be valuable and productive members
of society A wrongful living tort would also force courts to make an
inquiry into whether the worth of the plaintiff's life is so minimal that they
would be better off dead. Tis is a decision the judiciary is ill-equipped to
make.
Even if the courts could make such a decision, however, there are no
damages available which could put the plaintiff in the position in which he
356. Siemiemee v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691, 697 (Ill. 1987). This
result also satisfies another purpose of tort law- deterrence. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF
TORTS § 901 cmt. c (1979). Health care providers who know they will not be compensated for unwanted treatment are far less likely to provide it.
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would have been if not for a health care provider's failure to honor his
wishes: If the health care provider had not acted, the plaintiff would be
dead. Courts are not equipped to make a comparison between the relative
benefits of life with a disability and no life at all.
Courts need not take on the task of deciding whether a plaintiff's life
is worth living because there are adequate remedies available under familiar
tort principles for those whose refusal of life-sustaining treatment has not
been honored. Patients who have been treated against their wishes may
bring battery actions. These actions will allow them to be compensated for
the denial of their autonomy and force health care providers to bear the cost
of unwanted medical care. This will place patients and their families in the
same economic position in which they would have been had their wishes
been honored. Tis satisfies the basic rule of tort compensation and creates
a deterrent to the providing of unwanted treatment without requiring a court
to decide whether life with a disability is worth living.

